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T H E C O NCEPT OF H U M A N N A T U R E IN NEW E N G L A N D

1687-1787
ABSTRACT

Between 1680 and 1720 New England divines predominantly described
human nature from an avowedly theocentric stance.

A fter 1720 some

divines began to describe human nature from an anthropocentric position.
Samuel Willard, John

Wise, Jonathan

Edwards, Jonathan Mayhew, and

Charles Chauncy are the subjects of this investigation of the changing
nature of the theological anthropology in Puritan New England from 1687 to
1787.

Jerry D. Weber
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA

TH E C O NCEPT OF H U M A N N A T U R E IN NEW EN G L A N D

1687-1787

In trod uctio n

The subject under investigation is New England Puritan concepts of
human nature from 1687, the year Samuel Willard began his sermons on the
Westminster

Assembly’s

Chauncy died.

ShorterCatechism.

to

1787,

the

year

Charles

Five divines—Samuel Willard, John Wise, Jonathan Edwards,

Jonathan Mayhew, and Charles Chauncy--have been chosen to illustrate this
aspect of New England’s thought.

Each of these men represents an episode

in the history of the concept of human nature, and each provides a
contrast with the others.
Samuel

Willard, an

orthodox

Puritan

of

the seventeenth

century,

expounded a theocentric theological anthropology affirm ing a concept of
human nature as wholly depraved.

This view was opposed by John Wise,

who was influenced by the emerging natural rights theory in the early
eighteenth

century.

The

champion

of

orthodox

Puritanism

in

the

m id-eighteenth century was Jonathan Edwards. Edwards’s concept of human
nature, theocentric in foundation, emphasized the depravity of hum anity as
well as the natural abilities of humankind.

The anthropology of Edwards

stands in contrast to the anthropologies of his contemporaries, Jonathan
Mayhew and Charles Chauncy. Like Wise, Mayhew and Chauncy propounded
an anthropocentric theological anthropology.
The main purpose of this essay is to explicate the d iffe re n t concepts
of human nature in Puritan New England.

Between 1680 and 1720 New

England divines predominantly described human nature from an avowed
2

3

theocentric stance.

A fter

1720 some divines began to describe human

nature from an anthropocentric position.1

The concepts of human nature

espoused by Willard, Wise, Edwards, Mayhew, and Chauncy support a thesis
of change.

Like the economic, political, intellectual, and social worlds, the

theological world and, in turn, ideas about human nature were changing.
The objective of this essay will be to document the thesis of change and
explain the substance of the theological anthropology of New England.
The essay presupposes that opposites exist in any era.

The opposites

of this period are the theocentric and anthropocentric anthropologies of
five Puritan divines.

One manner of describing these opposites through

history would be to discuss them in terms of trends.

This study treats

these opposites, however, as episodes, with each Puritan divine a historical
individual

who expressed differin g relations of the opposites at their

moment in history.2

The present study is not so much concerned with

overarching trends as it is concerned with developments and the gener
ation of an empirically oriented history that adds depth to the existing
body of knowledge about human nature in American thought.

I

1 Merle Curti, Human Nature in American
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980).

Thought

2 For examples of this period discussed in terms of
trends see Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seven
teenth Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: H arvard University
Press, 1939); idem, The New England Mind: From Colony to
Province (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of the
H arvard University Press, 1959); Joseph Haroutunian, Pietv
Versus Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology
(New York: Holt & Co., 1932).

4

The Puritan theological world in seventeenth-century New England
rested upon three pillars: the doctrines of original sin, human depravity,
and irresistible grace.3
these three points.

Descriptions of human nature by Puritans reflect

The predecessors of Willard, Wise, Edwards, Mayhew,

and Chauncy, preachers such as John Cotton, Thomas Hooker, John Norton,
and Thomas Shepard, described hum anity as evil and sinful.

Humans in

their eyes were helpless and de-praved; were it not for a merciful God who
made a covenant of grace and salvation to the elect, they would suffer in
hell forever.4
The

innate

depravity

of hum ankind

is a basic theme

throughout Puritan reflections on human nature.

that

runs

The Puritans in New

England, however, made two types of statements about the depravity of the
hum an

condition:

one

was

theological,

the

other

psychological.

Theologically, the Puritans emphasized the fact that humans are "corrupt,
evil, and impotent," yet psychologically, they "made the most of what
remained of the divine image and built as much as possible upon the innate
law of nature or the inborn light of reason."5

On the one hand, they

stressed the inherently evil aspects of humanity, while on the other they
highlighted what good remained.
New England divines considered a human being "a whole creature
imbued with understanding, with a reasonable appetite, with affections
capable of divine objects, with apprehension and aspirations suitable" to its
nature, "being able to compare, connect, discourse, deduct, to remember,
3 Miller, The
Century, p. 22.

New

England

Mind:

4 Curti, Human Nature, pp. 45-46.
5 Ibid., pp. 256, 402.

The

Seventeenth

5

and perform other noble parts and actions."6 They characterized humans as
rational, although divine wisdom transcended the power of reason.

They

believed that knowledge was accumulated through the m ind’s apprehension
of God’s world.

External objects were judged by an innate will that could

distinguish between good and evil.7 The mind, however, became corrupt as
a result of the fall of Adam.

Therefore, reason, they stressed, was a

treacherous guide.8
In sum, theologically the Puritan forbears declared that humans were
corrupt, evil, and impotent, while through their faculty psychology they
described

how

the

m ind’s will

and

reason

were

out

of

balance

in

unregenerate human beings.9
D uring the course of the eighteenth century Willard, Wise, Edwards,
Mayhew, and Chauncy struggled with these two distinct elements of their
inherited anthropology—the theological and the psychological.

Each of

these divines would makes choices about which part of their tradition they
would emphasize.

In some instances they infused new elements into their

thought about human nature.

The story that unfolded in the eighteenth

century reflected the uneasy synthesis that explains seventeenth-century
New England Puritan concepts of human nature.

6 Ibid., p. 65.
7 Ibid., p. 248.
8 Ibid., p. 71.
9 Ibid., p. 256.

Two Stars of the First Magnitude:
Samuel Willard and John Wise
Samuel Willard’s and John Wise’s views of human nature were products of
their Puritan heritage.

Willard, born January 31, 1639, twelve years before

Wise, wrote and preached in terms that would have been fam iliar to his
forebears.

John Wise, on the other hand, wrote in a manner more akin to

the eighteenth century than the seventeenth.
commented on human nature in his writings.

Each of these ministers

Willard’s A Comoleat Body of

Divinity (1726) and Wise’s A Vindication of The Government of New
England Churches (1717) reveal their Puritan derivation.
Willard, orthodox in theology but liberal in the practice of religion,
undertook the most comprehensive attempt to form ulate a catechism of
American Puritanism.

With A Comoleat Body of Divinity, a collection of

sermons published in 1726, nineteen years after his death, Willard continued
the rational strain of Puritan thought in his use of the categories of
faculty psychology.

By incorporating the faculty psychology Willard’s

"summa theologica" disclosed close ties to an intellectual heritage that
demonstrated hum anity’s rational capacities and a tradition of piety.1
A Comoleat Body of Divinity, consisting of 914 folio pages, is "immense,
1 J. Rodney Fulcher, "Puritans and Their Passions: The
Faculty Psychology In American Puritanism," Journal of the
History of the Behavioral Sciences 9 (April 1973): 136-137.
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orderly, systematic, and detailed.”2

The foundation from which Willard

constructed these sermons, delivered once a month on Tuesday afternoons
from

1687 to 1707, was the Westminster Assembly’s Shorter Catechism.

Written in

dialogue form, the thirty-three chapters of sermons present the

central tenets of Puritan theology from a Calvinistic viewpoint.
stresses

the

Reformed

doctrines

of

scriptural

authority,

the

Willard
absolute

sovereignty of God, human dependence, predestination, and salvation by
faith .3

Willard argues, on the one hand, within the fram ework of the

covenant theology of New England for the external operations of the Spirit,
the "effectual calling.”

On the other hand, he explains the internal

operations of the Spirit by means of the faculty psychology.4
Knowledge, for Willard as for earlier Puritans, is a "relationship that
joins together the knowing mind and the external world." As Ernest Lowrie
explains Willard’s "light of nature," it is "grounded in God, visible through
the rational pattern of the given order of the universe," and capable of
comprehension

by the finite

understanding

self-evident

intelligence of humans.5

propositions,

but

is

a

Reason

"curious

collection by the mind through "observation and Experience."6
2 Samuel Willard, A Comoleat Body of D ivinity, foreword
by Edw ard M. G riffin (1726; reprint, New York & London:
Johnson R eprint Corp., 1969), p. v.
3 Fulcher, "Puritans and Their Passions," p. 136.
4 Ibid., p. 137.
5 Ernest B. Lowrie, The Shape of the Puritan Mind: The
Thought of Samuel Willard (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1974), p. 30.
6 Perry Miller, The New England Mind: From Colony to
Province (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of the
H arvard University Press, 1959), p. 428.

is not

inquiry,"

a

As it was

8

for his forebears, so to for Willard, the m ind’s power of internal reasoning
was a poor guide.

In Perry Miller’s words, Samuel Willard’s mind was

"completely enclosed in the traditional rhetoric and logic."7
John Wise’s mind and writings developed out of the course of Puritan
thought but had d ifferen t emphases; at numerous points he exceeded the
bounds

of

traditional

covenant

theology.

Wise

defends

the

constitution of his elders, the Cambridge Platform of 1648, but
in an unconventional manner.

church

hedoes so

Instead of relying on the Word of God alone,

Wise appeals for ecclesiastical democracy by citing the Puritan concept of
history, New England’s provincial experience, and taking Samuel P ufendorf
as his "Chief Guide and Spokesman."8

Thus John Wise introduces the

natural rights theory of continental Europe to New England Puritanism.
Perry Miller describes Wise’s "shift" from defender of Congregationalism "to
the champion of laws of reason and nature and to the character of the
social

compact" as "no violent

break

in

the course of New

England

thought."9 John Wise and Samuel Willard are representative figures of New
England thought in their theology and concepts of human nature.

I
7 Ibid., p. 421.
8 John Wise, A Vindication of the Government of New
England
Churches
(1717; reprint,
Gainesville, Florida:
Scholar’s Facsimile & Reprint, 1958), p. 32.
9 Perry Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Belknap Press of the H arvard University
Press, 1956), p. 98.
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In A Comoleat Body of Divinity Samuel Willard defines the nature of a
creature as "those powers and principles which are put into it, whereby it
is rendered capable of acting in its own orb."

The nature of a reasonable

creature, a human being, "is that power which it had given it to act as a
moral agent under a rule," an agent endowed with an "ability of knowing,
and electing, or chusing and refusing."

The actions of the creature are

those things th at are accomplished by the "exertion of that nature or
principle which is in it; or whatsoever it doth under the influence of its
reason and will."10

The fu rth er description of hum an nature that Willard

presents revolves around his fundam ental theological beliefs in the fall of
Adam, and original sin.
nature

of

humans

Therefore much of what Willard ascribes to the

either

supports

these

beliefs

by

describing

the

unregenerate state of humans or is an explication of regenerate Christians
who have felt the stirrings of grace.
Concentrating on unregenerate humanity, Willard bases his depiction of
hum ankind on secondary theological beliefs that interlock with his primary
theological tenets.
end,

is

wise,

God, the creator of all things, made all things for an

and

"therefore

would

not

make

anything

in

vain."

Accordingly, God created humans with a nature suited to their end.11 The
end for which the human being is created is "to Glorify God, and Enjoy
him for ever."

Humans, being distinct from other creatures, were "made

capable of Happiness: which no other inferior creature can attain unto."
Happiness consists only in following one’s "Chief End." To follow their end
and glorify God, humans must seek to live according to God’s will, thus
10 Willard, Body of D ivinity, p. 209.
11 Ibid.
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making themselves dependent beings. A "Dependent Being" means that one’s
felicity

is

Felicity."12

not

from

oneself—God alone

is the

"Adequate

Object

for

This "Quest for Happiness" is a principle that is so much a

part of human nature "that all The Mischief which the Fall hath done"
cannot deprive humans of this pursuit.13 The fall of Adam made humankind
"Miserable," but it did not sever the "possibility of being restored to
Felicity."

Unregenerate

humans,

then, are "not only not Happy, but

extremely Miserable," for they are "under a Necessity of going abroad" to
seek happiness.14
The mischief of the Fall and original sin did not deny this "Quest for
Happiness," but it did make humans "truly and woefully Miserable and
Wretched."

Adam’s sin

removed

humankind

from

"that

Nearness"

to

happiness; they became "separated" from their end; they have "fallen short
of the Glory of God, (Rom. 3:23) and [are] removed from the Enjoyment of
Him (Isai. 59:2)."

As a result of the loss of their "Blessedness" Willard

declares hum ankind "wretched";15 humans "fell from Life into a state of
Death."

Humans

are

born

"actually

miserable";

the

recovery

from

wretchedness "is an act of God’s sovereign Pleasure."

Here again Willard

shows the necessity of human reliance upon God.

Any reconciliation

"derives from hence and hath its dependence on God."16
12 Ibid., pp. 2, 7.
13 Ibid., p. 7.
14 Ibid., p. 8.
15 Ibid., p. 11.
16 Ibid., p. 14.

A fter this brief
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outline of his concept of human nature, Willard describes human nature in
more detail but never outside of this theological context.
An additional component of Willard’s theological context is the "Goodness
of God" which is available to all human beings.

The Goodness of the Lord

"hath fallen on sinful Man for its subject, and is therefore in a more
restrained sense called the Mercy of God."

God’s mercy or Common

Goodness is defined as "God willing to succor sinful Man in their Misery."
God’s mercy is displayed to all, "both good and bad,"17 and is free as well.
God’s grace, however, is extended to only a few, the predestined.

God’s

grace, along with original sin, the fall of Adam, and subsequent misery of
hum ankind, completes a sketch of Willard’s theology.
From his theological context Willard describes the "Special Nature" of
humans.

God created humans but unlike other living creatures God made

them "Reasonable Living Creature[s]."

Human beings were given a "Special

Nature," whereby "as the head of the Lower World" they were "to direct"
themselves "and improve the other beings, to the Glory of . . .
creator."

, their

God, creating humans last of all the creatures, endowed them

with the powers of reason "because otherwise [God] would not have been a
suitable ruler."

Human dominion over the other living creatures "requires

Wisdom and Discretion."

With the ability to reason, humans are "capable of

guiding them [the other animals] according to the Rules of right Reason."18
The "Rules of right Reason" will suffice in the temporal world, but reason
is an unsafe guide in the spiritual world.
17 Ibid., pp. 81, 87.
18 Ibid., pp. 122, 128.
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Accordingly, Willard describes human nature as divided into a body and a
soul, a motive life and a life of sense.19
after Immortality"

Because of the soul’s "Desire

human beings seek eternal life.

The soul is endowed

with something else as well—the "Facilities of Understanding and Will."20
The human creature was made "a Moral Agent, a Cause by Counsel," and
because God gave humans a reasoning ability, they "therefore must have a
Moral Goodness."

This moral goodness "was an Imprinted Goodness or

Rectitude" that remains even in fallen humanity.

Willard concludes that "it

was then a Stamp and Character of Divine Goodness left upon" human
nature.21

Unfallen humanity could understand and comprehend "all the

Intellectual virtues fitting"

their

ability "to discern,

regulate" themselves in "doing the Will of God."

Spiritually they could

discern "all that was needful" of their happiness.22
worked together.

A fter the

Reason and the will

Fall, however, humans lost

and the two fell out of balance.

approve of, and

this discernment

As a result, reason, which had lost its

moral goodness, became an unreliable guide for the soul.
At the time of creation God implanted in humans a law of "Gubernation"
along with moral goodness.

This

natural law is given

to all of God’s

creatures, for "God directs and leads the Creatures in the Right Way," to
the attainm ent of their end.

Willard notes, "there is an Ordering in the

World," a great chain of being where "all the Actions of all Beings" are
19 Ibid., pp. 119, 123.
20 Ibid., p. 123.
21 Ibid., p. 125.
22 Ibid., p. 126.
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designed by God to serve to some end.23
describes an "Order of Superiority"
parents,

a

wife

her

husband,

and

In a subsequent sermon Willard

in which children should obey their
a

servant

its

master.24

Willard

summarizes that "all the Natural Actions of all these Creatures are guided
by Some rule of Government."25
The rule of government in all creatures becomes the "Law of Nature," and
is "nothing else but the Impression of God upon the Creature’s Nature."
is "an inclination

or promptitude natural

accordance with this law.
"endowed with sense."
forth noble Acts."

It

in the Creature" to act in

In other words, it is a "natural Instinct" that is

Because of this the creature is "instigated to put

This "Law of Nature" in its ultimate form becomes an

"Obedient Power" wherein the creature is subject to a "passive Obedience to
the will of the Creator" that entails a "sovereign Pre-determination" of all
the creature’s actions.26
For the "Reasonable Creature" there is a special government called the
"Moral Law."

Humans, being the reasonable creatures of God’s creation, are

"capable of chusing their own Actions"; they can "act upon Deliberation,
and either Elect or Reject."
with a moral rule.

To guide their choosing God provides humans

The "Moral Law," as Willard defines it, is a "Divine

Unchangeable Rule" given to all hum ankind in accordance with their nature,
as created by God, that obliges them "to serve to God’s Glory" and attain
23 Ibid., pp. 142-145.
24 Ibid., p. 608.
25 Ibid., p. 145.
26 Ibid., p. 146.

14

their "Last End."27 Without this law, the moral actions of humans, "which
are only truely and properly Humane, would be under no Government, and
hence they would serve no End."

Willard fu rther explains that this law "is

therefore usually called by Divines, the Law of Nature; not in a larger
sense respecting the Whole Nature of the Creature, but refrained, relative
to" human nature.28
In their natural estate human beings "abide under the law as a Covenant"
and as a "Rule."

If they adhere to the terms of the Covenant "they shall

live, if otherwise they shall die."29 God gave this law to Adam and meant
it to be "perpetual."

As a result of the Fall, however, humans "lost the

Sense" of the "Moral Law".

A "New edition appeared to Moses on Mount

Sinai, the Ten Commandments."30

Whatever its form, though, the "Moral

Law" is a "Special Government" for "Reasonable Creatures," which guides
them to "a state of Happiness or Misery, according to the Tenour of the
Moral Law."31
Willard certainly believed that humans had fallen from their primitive
estate

by

sinning

against

God;

they

fell

"from

Government into Misery," but did not fall from
Obedience."

the

Rule

of

God’s

their "Obligation of

The "proper Fall" of humankind was from the "Rule of Life

into Misery,"32 and since the covenant of works was made with Adam, "not
27 Ibid., pp. 149, 565-568.
28 Ibid., p. 150.
29 Ibid., p. 567-568.
30 Ibid., p. 150.
31 Ibid., p. 149.
32 Ibid., pp. 156-157.

15

only for himself, but for his Posterity," all of his descendants "by ordinary
generation sinned in him, and fell with him in his First Transgression."33
The misery into which hum ankind fell is one of "lost Communion with
God."34 By virtue of original sin their estate became sinful.

In a complete

explanation, Willard, echoing the Westminster Shorter Catechism, states that
the estate whereunto humans fell, "consists in the guilt of Adam’s first sin,
the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature,
which

is

commonly

called

original

sin;

together

with

all

actual

transgressions which proceed from it." In effect, humans are "born into the
world under guilt."35
The world they are born into is a world of sin.

Sin is the "common

disease" of humankind, which "the whole race is fallen into" (Rom. 5:12).
When Adam committed the original sin he forfeited for himself and his
posterity "all claim to any Goodness, and could expect nothing at God’s
hands."

The only thing that he and hum ankind could expect was that God’s

"revenging Justice would fall upon them and cut them off."

Adam’s sin put

hum anity "under the Curse of Death, which contains in it a loss of all good
and a suffering of every evil."

Furthermore, it "brought him into a low

Condition, cast him into a dungeon of distress, a pit of misery, he was laid
by the Curse as low as Hell itself."

Through the offering of grace,

however, certain of God’s creatures could be drawn "out of this Pit" and
delivered "from the Lowest Hell."36
33 Ibid., p. 194.
34 Ibid., p. 216.
35 Ibid., p. 205.
36 Ibid., pp. 81, 88.
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Original sin consisted of humans losing sight of their end.

At their

creation humans were "appointed to serve to the Glory of God, by an active
conform ity to the Law of Obedience."

The moral rectitude of humans

depended upon God and hum anity abiding unto the law of God.

Since

humans, being moral agents, had moral powers, an inclination to follow the
moral law, and the ability to do so, their "nature was set right; and this
was truly" their "righteous-ness and holiness which is therefore said to be
renewed in conversion."37 In natural, fallen, or unregenerate humans, there
is a lack of moral rectitude, and by the "contracting of the contrary habit"
human nature "is swerved from the Law."
reason from its rule is original sin.

Properly called, the swerving of

Original sin consists of "the loss of

original righteousness, or the image of God," and the "corruption of the
whole nature by the introduction of a contrary image."38
In order to explain the image of God, Willard makes a distinction between
the natural and moral attributes of humans.

Their natural attributes are

the rational powers of understanding and willing.
he

makes

attributes.

a

fu rth er
An

distinction

external

moral

With the moral attributes

between

internal

attribute

is

and

dominion

external
over

moral

creatures.

Internal moral attributes are the habits of grace or holiness infused by God.
The habits
first."39

of grace or holiness, "belonged" to the human nature "at

Willard asks, is this image of God natural or supernatural?

His

response is that it is "connatural:" the image of God would not belong to
37 Ibid., p. 209.
38 Ibid., p. 210.
39 Ibid.
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human nature, "merely considered as humanity," for if it did it would mean
that humans would "cease" to be humans "upon the loss of it."40
Through original sin hum anity lost the image of God and by so doing
"hath contracted" certain characteristics.
impotency to do that which is truly good."

The first of these is "an utter
A human "not only doth not do

it, which belongs to actual sin," but "cannot do" good.

At one time, before

the Fall, humans could do good, but now all their strength is gone.41
Willard’s second description of hum anity after the loss of God’s image
portrays the creature as having "an universal indisposition to that which is
good."
End."

In essence humans have lost their desire to serve God’s "Chief
As a result, the whole of the human nature is corrupt.

Instead of

having the image of God in their nature, hum anity has the image of sin,
and from this arises "an utter averseness to that which is spiritually good"
and "a violent propenseness to evil."42
Willard poses the question "What is man?" His response is the following:
he is a creature utterly void of all goodness, and a seminary of all
m anner of abominations. There are not the vilest actions of the worst
sinners, who have been monsters of men, whose actions stand as so
many blots Scripture register, but there are seeds of them all in the
head of every child of Adam. There is not the least
part of any
theological good left in any of his posterity, by nature. There is a
concatenation of all sins in the spawn of them within, a whole old man,
That hath every lust, as so many members, belonging to it; this is man:
think of it and be proud if you can.43
These are harsh words, but they follow faith fu lly the Calvinistic tradition
of Willard’s Puritan heritage.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 211.

18

Willard’s description of the natural estate of hum anity is exhaustive and
portrays one aspect of the Puritan concept of human nature.

Another facet

of the P uritan concept of human nature emerged from the pen of John
Wise.

Willard’s thought

expression.

was orthodox

Puritanism

in its content

and

John Wise, however, rejected the orthodox doctrine of the

depravity of human nature in favor of a concept of human nature based on
the natural law theory of Samuel Pufendorf.
In defending the congregational form of church polity, Wise begins A
Vindication of the Government of New England Churches by stating his
purpose: "I shall consider man in a state of natural being, as a free-born
subject under the crown of heaven, and owing homage to none but God
himself."

He continues, "I shall more distinctly explain the state of human

nature in its original capacity," for humans are put on earth by God, and
blessed with "many investitures, and immunities which properly belong" to
hum ankind.44
The fundam ental characteristic, or "the prime immunity," that Wise notes
in the natural state of hum anity is that humans are "most properly the
subject of the law of nature."

Human beings are "the favourite animal on

earth; in that this part of God’s image, viz. reason is cogenate with [this]
nature."

Through this immutable law of reason and its being a part of the

human nature "God has provided a rule" for human beings "in all their
actions" that obliges each to do that which is right, "not merely as to
justice, but likewise as to all other moral virtues," which is "nothing but
the dictate of right reason founded in the soul of man."45
44 John Wise, A V indication, p. 33.
45 Ibid., p. 34.

Immediately a
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distinction can be made between Willard and Wise in the emphasis that each
places on reason.

The orthodox content of Willard’s beliefs would not allow

him to put as much trust in reason as Wise did.
The law of nature that humans are subject to is a product of their
reason.

As Wise defines the law of nature, it is "that which is to be drawn

from [human] reason, flowing from the true current of th at facility, when
unperverted, may be said to be the law of nature, on which account, the
Holy Scriptures declare it written" on the hearts of hum anity.46

Wise

qualifies this definition by saying that
when we acknowledge
Reason, we must mean
such a power, as to
Condition to discover a

the law of nature to be the dictate of Right
that the Understanding of Man is Endowed with
be able, from the contemplation of human
necessity of living agreeable with this law.47

Wise grounds this in Scripture, "for being endowed with a soul, you may
know from yourself, how, and what you ought to act (Rom. 2:14)."

All of

this leads Wise to declare that the nature of humanity is inherently good
and reasonable.

He states that although "a principle of self-love and

self-preservation is very predominant" in every human being, they are "also
possessed of a sociable disposition and an affection to live to m ankind in
general."48

With respect to human nature, John Wise has removed his

thinking from the rigid orthodoxy of his elders.49
Reason

is

fu rth er

emphasized

when

Wise states

that

"Reason"

and

"Revelation" are "equally" emanations of God’s Wisdom in "hanging out so
46 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
47 Ibid., p. 35.
48 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
49 Clinton L. Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: The
Origin of the American Tradition of Political Liberty (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), p. 215.
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many Lights to guide [humans] through a dark World."

Wise goes fu rth er

and allows reason to replace revelation—"the light of Reason as a Law and
Rule of Right is an E ffect of Christ’s goodness, care and creating Power, as
well as of Revelation; though Revelation in N ature’s Law in a fairer and
brighter Edition."50
revelation.

In "Nature’s Law" reason is a better guide than

Samuel Willard and the Puritan elders could not allow reason to

supersede divine revelation.

To them reason was a fal-lible guide.

Wise in

a bold stroke did the unthinkable—he stated that "Natural Reason is to be
accounted, Jure Divino, in matters of Religion."51 Wise completely reversed
the emphasis of Puritan thought from revelation to reason in A Vindication.
Wise notes a "second great immunity" of humanity, "an original liberty"
stamped upon their rational nature. He explains fu rth er that he "shall wave
the consideration of" hum anity’s moral turpitude" and instead view them
"physically as a creature" of God’s creation that has been given many
"ennobling immunities." These immunities render the human being "the most
august animal in the world," and despite the fall of Adam, the human
"remains at the upper-end of nature, and as such is a creature of a very
noble

character."52

In

contrast

to Willard, Wise’s characterization

of

human nature focuses on the positive aspects, not the disparaging ones of
an im pudent and evil creature.
The introduction of "an original liberty" by Wise is generally attributed to
the

fact

that Wise chose Samuel P ufendorf as his "Chief Guide and

Spokesman."

P u fen d o rf’s work De Jure Nature et Gentium, first published

50 Wise, A Vindication, pp. 30-32.
51 Ibid., p. 32.
52 Ibid., pp. 34, 37.
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in Latin in 1672, had been printed in English in 1703 and again in 1710. It
is possible that Wise read the original Latin, but it is assumed by most
scholars, since many of Wise’s phrases are adaptations of the 1710 version,
that he studied P ufendorf after 1710.53 Following P u fen d o rf’s natural law
theory, Wise states that the "third capital immunity" which belongs to the
human

nature

is

an

"equality

amongst"

themselves.54

In

subsequent

paragraphs Wise combines "an original liberty" with an "equality amongst"
themselves to prove the fundam ental goodness of humankind.
The term Wise introduces to show human goodness is "Sociableness."
Beginning with the statement that human beings in their natural state "must
be free and at [their] own dispose," Wise fu rth er states that they are
"impelled to enter into a civil community" and divest themselves of their
"natural freedom," and enter into a compact with their fellow human beings.
The forming of governments and "yielding" of natural liberty are of
necessity "to guard" humans against themselves, there being "none so good
to man, as man, and yet none a greater enemy."55

This reveals Wise’s

belief in both good and bad motives in humans; if he had stopped here, it
would seem that Wise, like Thomas Hobbes in The Leviathan, saw life as
"nasty, poor, brutish, and short."
Wise, however, takes Hobbes* conclusion and transforms it into a belief in
the goodness of humankind.

True, human beings are creatures "desirous" of

their "own preservation," they are "exposed to many wants," and yet they
still "are unable to secure" their "own safety and maintenance."
53 Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic, p. 213.
54 Wise, A Vindication, p. 34.
55 Ibid., p. 33.
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these factors that point to human self-interest and brutish ignorance of
fellow humans, human beings are also "able of returning kindness by the
furtherance of m utual good."56
human

beings

are

"often

In a qualifying argument Wise states that

found

to

be malicious,

insolent, and

easily

promoted and as powerful in effecting mischief" as they are "ready in
designing it."57

For such creatures to be preserved "it is necessary" that

they "be Sociable."58

"Sociableness" is the ability of humans to "unite

[themselves] to those of [their] own species, and to regulate [themselves]
towards them, that they may have no fair reason to harm others but rather
incline

to

promote

concerns."59

[another’s]

interests,

and

serve

[their]

rights

and

In summary, "Sociableness" is a "fundamental law of nature,

th at every [human being], to the best of their ability, do m aintain a
sociableness with others, agreeable with the main end and disposition of
human nature in general."

The final conclusion for John Wise, in reference

to hum an nature, is th at "from the principles of sociableness it follows as a
fundam ental law of nature" that humans are "not so wedded to [their] own
interest but that [they] can make the common good" their goal.60
At first glance Wise’s "Sociableness" might be mistaken as a divergence
from the course of Puritan thought, but in actuality, as Perry Miller
observes,

it

has

a

correlation

56 Ibid., p. 36.
57 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 37.
60 Ibid.

with

the

covenant

theology

of

earlier
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Puritanism .61

A component of covenant theology was the promoting of

certain ends for the good of the faithful; it was a duty commanded by the
Law

of

the

Gospel.

John

Wise’s

"Sociableness"

appropriates

this

fundam ental point, but Wise does so from an angle that incorporates natural
law theory, not merely the Law of the Gospel.
Both Samuel Willard and John Wise were true to their P uritan heritage
but each in a d ifferen t way.

Willard defended the orthodox doctrines of

original sin and human depravity, but he did so in a "systematic exposition"
that emphasized the rationalist side of the Puritan tradition.62 Like earlier
Puritan divines, Willard regarded "volitional integrity as essential," yet he
never lost sight of the strong tradition of piety w ithin Puritanism or its
orthodox doctrines.63 Willard in this sense foreshadowed the work of men
like Charles Chauncy, who also held to the rationalist side of the Puritan
tradition, but Willard more than anyone upheld

the orthodox Puritan

doctrines of his forebears.
John Wise, on the other hand, reached into the fu tu re and placed a
greater emphasis upon the power of reason, an emphasis that would come to
dominate the intellectual world later in the eighteenth century.

Merle

Curti notes that Wise reflects the transition from Puritanism to the En
lightenment insofar as he incorporates aspects of both.64

In this sense,

then, Wise can be described as the Puritan "off-beam."65
61 Miller, Errand, pp. 97-98.
62 Fulcher, "Puritans and Their Passions," p. 137.
63 Ibid.
64 Merle Curti, Human Nature in American Thought.
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), p. 76.
65 Michael M cGiffert, personal interview, April 10, 1984.
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In A Comoleat Body of Divinity Willard described human nature as
wretched.

In A Vindication of the Government of the Churches of New

England, more than an ecclesiastical tract and much like the political
treatises of Revolutionary America, Wise portrayed hum anity in the light of
reason and declared it essentially good.

Though reason had once been

looked upon as a treacherous guide, it had gained an endorsement from a
Puritan divine, John Wise.

Both characterizations of human nature are part

of the course of New England thought.

In conjunction with each other

they m ark out the bounds of intellectual discourse about human nature that
was to take place in New England after 1720.

"Natural Men in a D readful Condition":
Jonathan Edwards
If John Wise’s "Enlightenment" attitudes took Puritanism o ff course by
infusing it with concepts of natural rights, Jonathan Edwards wanted to
return New England to its orthodox Puritan foundations.1 Edwards, colonial
America’s preeminent philosopher-theologian, not only defended the views of
orthodox Puritan theology, but incorporated into his concept of human
nature much that was new.

He appropriated the emerging science of Isaac

Newton and followed the monistic psychology of John Locke.

The concept

of human nature th at Edwards created reflects these influences.
The manner in which Edwards described human nature can be discussed
on two levels.

On one level stand Edwards’s metaphysical views about

human nature; on the other are his scriptural beliefs about humanity.
Edw ards’s metaphysical explanations,

when coupled with

his scriptural

beliefs about human nature, are the basis for an anthropology unique in the
history of New England Puritanism.
Jonathan Edw ards’s views about human nature were under-girded by his
early scientific and philosophical writings.

The sermons he preached in

Northam pton (1726-1751) reveal the scriptural basis for his accounts of
hum anity and outline a completely d ifferen t aspect of Edw ards’s theological
1 See especially Norman Fiering, "Will and Intellect in
the New England Mind," William and Marv Quarterly 29 (1972):
551-558; James Hoopes "Jonathan Edwards’s Religious Psychol
ogy," Journal of American History 69 (1983): 849-865.
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anthropology.

His published works, Religious Affections. Freedom of the

Will. Dissertation on the End in Creation. Nature of True V irtue, and
Original Sin, are examples of the melding together of the two strains of
thought, the metaphysical and scriptural.2

I
The scientific and philosophic writings, "Of Being," "Of Atoms," and
"The Mind," provide the foundation for Edw ards’s religious psychology.
These

writings also serve to outline

his metaphysical ideas.

Wallace

Anderson notes that "Of Atoms" is an example of Edw ards’s "metaphysical
materialism"; "Of Being" and "The Mind" are aspects of his "idealistic
phenomenalism."3 In order to comprehend the anthropology Edwards forged
it

is

necessary

reflections.

to

understand

his

epistemological

To discuss Edw ards’s anthropology

and

metaphysical

without first looking at his

metaphysical ideas would be an error, for, as Edwards notes, it is necessary
th at something exist before it can be discussed.

Treating Edw ards’s ideas

about hum anity developmentally, one finds that the metaphysical reflections
of these works serve as the foundation from which Edwards constructed a
more complete concept of human nature.
2 The complete titles of these works are as follows: A
Treatise Concerning Religious Affections. In Three Parts: A
Careful and Strict Inquiry into the modern prevailing
Notions of the Freedom of the Will. Which is supposed to be
essential to Moral Agency. Virtue and Vice. Reward and
Punishment. Praise and Blame: Dissertation Concerning the
End for Which God Created the World: Dissertation on the
Nature of True Virtue: and The Great Christian Doctrine of
Original Sin D efended.
The short titles used in this
paragraph will be used elsewhere in this paper.
3 Jonathan Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific
and Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of The Works of Jonathan
Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 53.
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Emerging from the scientific and philosophical writings is Jonathan
E dw ards’s idealism.4

In these works Edwards is beholden to John Locke

and the Cambridge Platonists such as Henry More.5 Like Locke, Edwards
distinguished between primary and secondary qualities of bodies.

Unlike

Locke, however, he did not argue for the reality of primary qualities.

The

prim ary

not

qualities—solidity,

extension,

figure,

and

motion—became

m aterial existence but merely "resistance," and "resistance," Edwards states,
is "nothing but the exertion of God’s power."6 All of what is observed by
human beings that gives them the idea of solidity of bodies is resistance.
The property of resistance has no

substance,

yet we know it toexist; it

exists in the mind for there is a

one-to-one

correspondence between the

object of perception and the perceived idea.
on

the

supposition

that

"nothing

Edwards’s idealism, then, rests

has existence

anywhere

else but

in

consciousness,"7 for all "real existence depends on perception."8
Knowledge in this scheme originates in sensation and apprehension by
the mind.

Arising in piecemeal fashion via the senses, knowledge is ordered

appreciation

and

reflection;

it

is definite

because

it

is ordered

comprehensible; yet it is limited by its fragm entary character.
4 See George Rupp, "The ‘Idealism’ of Jonathan
Edwards," H arvard Theological Review 62 (1969): 209-226.
5 For a discussion of the influence of the Cambridge
Platonists on Edwards see Ibid., pp. 23-24, 98, 111-112; see
also Emily Stipes Watts, "Jonathan Edwards and the Cambridge
Platonists," (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois,
1963).
6 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 351.

and Philosophical

7 Edwards, "Of Being,"
Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 204.

and Philosophical

8 Edwards, "Notes on
Knowledge and Existence,"
Scientific and Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 398.

and

"Intuition,"
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a type of knowledge, is an immediate awareness of the objects of sensation.
For Edwards, intuitive knowledge is not the full content of knowledge but
it is a self-evident truth such as "the grass is green," that is based on
immediate sensation.9
Revelation also plays a part in Edwards’s metaphysical explanation.

As

the reservoir of real truth, revelation enters the mind by the "Divine
Light."

The "Divine Light" is an illumination wherein reality is revealed to

the eye of the soul.

This takes place in one instant, is immediate, and

brings about the fulness of reason.10

Through the senses, or perception of

the aesthetic, the mind perceives the natural

world, enters the realm of

intuition or experience, and has finite knowledge.
aesthetic

principles,

with

its

finite

knowledge,

This finite process of
does

not

provide

the

inform ation that is supplied by the infinite knowledge and beauty of the
divine and supernatural light of God the creator.11

Through the "Divine

Light" humans are able in a finite

manner to comprehend the infinite

goodness and beauty of the creator.

Human knowledge of all things in

Edw ards’s metaphysical idealism is finite.
The universe in which hum anity lives is a structure of determ inate parts,
ordered

and

governed

by

invisible

discoverable by the finite human mind.

laws.

Certain

natural

laws

are

Edwards’s characterization of the

universe in this instance relies upon his fam iliarity with the works of Isaac
Newton.

Jonathan Edwards cited Newton on numerous occasions.

9 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 346.

and

Philosophical

10 H. G. Townsend, Philosophical Ideas in the United
States (New York: American Book Co., 1934), p. 43.
11 Ibid.

In three
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of his less known works, "Of Insects,"12 "Things to be Considered,"13 and
"Of the Rainbow,"14 Edwards refers to Newton’s Optics, on the incurvation
of rays.

And in "The Mind," No. 65, on motion, Edwards’s concept of

absolute, relative, and absolute circular motion is derived from Newton’s
Principia.15 Newtonian science influenced Edw ards’s scientific writings by
showing and proving that the universe was governed by laws.16
Edw ards’s work in "Of Atoms" evinces one of the invisible laws of of the
universe, his theory of "atomism."

According to Edwards, all bodies "except

atoms, themselves, must of absolute necessity be composed of atoms, or of
bodies that are indiscerpible, that cannot be made less."

They are held

together

infinite

by

an

in fin ite

power

and

cannot

whatsoever, be separated one from another."17

"by

any

power

The solidity that these

bodies exhibit is "nothing but resistance to other solidities."18 These solids
occupy space and resist each other.

The space that these bodies occupy

12 Edwards,
"Of Insects," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 159.

and

Philosophical

13 Edwards, "Things to be Considered,"
and Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 221.

Scinetific

14 Edwards,
"Of
the
Rainbow,"
Scientific
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 298.
15 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 383.

and

and

Philosophical

16 Edwards,
"Editor’s Introduction,"
Scientific
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, pp. 41-47.

and

17 Edwards,
"Of Atoms," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 208.

and

Philosophical

18 Edwards,
"Of Being," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 202.

and

Philosophical
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operates under the necessary and fixed law that relies upon the "external,
infinite, and omni-present being," God.19
Edw ards’s scientific conception of nature, consisting of atoms, space,
and resistance, fundam entally grounds itself in the power and wisdom of
God.

Throughout his life Edwards held in awe the "wisdom of God" in

contriving the whole system.20 Whether he was conscious of it or not, the
philosopher-scientist

of

Edwards’s

youth,

as

Wallace

Anderson

states,

investigated the world from an avowed "theological setting."21
Another of Edw ards’s early works, "Of Being," exhibits two important
parts of the scientific and philosophic learning of his youth.22

The two

main claims are that "nothing can be without being known" and that
"nothing

has

any

existance

anywhere

else but

therefore, does not exist unless it is perceived.23
object must be apprehended by the mind.

in

consciousness,"

and

To exist, the physical

For Edwards this means that it

is impossible "that anything should be, and nothing know it," for "those
beings that have knowledge and consciousness are the only proper and real
and substantial beings."24
19 Ibid., p. 203.
20 Edwards, "Wisdom in the Contrivance of the World,"
Scientific and Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, pp.
307-310.
21 Edwards,
"Editor’s Introduction,"
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 49.

Scientific

and

22 Ibid., p. 77.
23 Edwards, "Of Being," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 204.
24 Ibid.

and

Philosophical
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In "The Mind" Edwards continued to be concerned with the "existence of
bodies and the manner of their dependence upon the mind," rather than as
the title implies "the existence and nature of minds themselves."25 Edwards
is initially

concerned

with

excellency

in

"The Mind"

and

Being

states

"all

excellency is harmony,

symmetry or proportion."26

"consists in relations," a

relationship between the real object and the mind

or between two or more objects.27 The truth in general of

as a result

a relationship

"is the consisting of our ideas with those ideas . . . that are raised in our
minds according to God’s stated order and Law."28

With respect to the

knowledge of the perceiving mind, Edwards, as Wallace Anderson states,
"does not suppose that physical objects are merely nominal entities."

As

did Locke, Edwards "holds that bodies have real natures independent of the
ideas

and

beliefs

we form

concerning

them."29

With regard

to the

connection between bodies and minds or spirits, the two have distinct
natures w ith the mind having a superior ontological status.30
When Edwards wrote "Of Being," he followed the work of Henry More and
concluded that space is a necessary spiritual being—spirits are extended and
25 Edwards,
"Editor’s Introduction," Scientific
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 111.
26 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 332.
27 Edwards,
"Editor’s Introduction,"
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 84.
28 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, pp. 341-342.
29 Edwards,
"Editor’s Introduction,"
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 97.
30 Ibid., p. 111.

and

Philosophical
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and

Philosophical
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do occupy space.31 In "The Mind" a body consists in nothing but the ideas
of

sensation

as

they

are

expressed

communicated to the mind by God."

externally

and

"immediately

Anderson fu rth er points out that for

Edwards in "Miscellanie" No. 267, "it appears that a mind itself is nothing
but various thoughts, perceptions, etc., which are likewise immediately
produced and sustained by God."32 The identity of the mind, then, depends
on the essential being, God.

Edwards therefore in "The Mind" substantially

revised his acceptance of Henry More’s "space as necessary being."
In rethinking More’s proposition, Edwards was influenced by John Locke’s
idea of "consciousness and immediate self-consciousness" as the "marks of
the mental."33 Edwards conceives of a mind as "nothing but consciousness,
and what is included in it."34

This consciousness "is to all intents and

purposes the very same spirit or substance, as much as the same particle of
m atter can be the same with itself at d ifferent times."35 Substance or the
material world is "absolutely dependent on the conception of the mind."

As

we have seen, the m ind’s conceptions depend upon God, for the substance
of all bodies is "the infinitely exact and precise and perfectly stable idea in
God’s mind."36

God’s stable will, the idea in God’s mind, "shall gradually

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 111-113.
33 Ibid., p. 112.
34 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 342.
35 Ibid., pp. 342-343.
36 Ibid., p. 344.

and
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be communicated to us, and to other minds” according to the laws of the
universe.37
Just as the universe and nature are governed by "certain fixed and exact
established methods and laws," humans, too, have certain fixed dispositions.
For example, Edwards notes th at human beings have an "innate moral
disposition" that guides their actions.38 Human action requires thought and
judgment by the mind and the mind must first perceive before it acts; it
requires knowledge.

Not only do we have an innate disposition to guide

our thought processes before we act, but humans also have a will.

In

Edw ards’s psychology and anthropology the will is paramount, for in any
action by the mind the will is solicited.

The will, however, is only one

component of Edw ards’s psychology.
The

psychology

of

Edwards’s forefathers,

the

faculty

psychology, compartmentalized the faculties of the mind.

or

scholastic

On one hand, the

Puritans explained how humans have an intellect which is the king of the
faculties, also known as the reasonable soul, which is located in the head,
while on the other hand they described a separate faculty, the queen of the
faculties, the will, which is found in the heart and is the power of the
reasonable soul.

Edwards rejected the faculty psychology of his Puritan

forefathers in favor of a monistic psychology.
In Edw ards’s thought the will and the inclination to action are one and
the same: "the will is no otherwise d ifferen t from inclination, than that we
commonly call that the will that is the m ind’s inclination with respect to

37 Ibid.
38 Edwards,
"Editor’s Introduction,"
Scientific
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 119.

and
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its own immediate actions.”39 Edwards’s writings on the will in "The Mind"
set fo rth the principles which he explains in detail in Freedom of the Will.
"The Mind" is im portant in that it points to fu rth er development.

It shows

Edwards "moving away from the traditional concept of will and intellect as
distinct powers or faculties of the mind, and toward the conception of
distinct kinds or modes of apprehension of perception of objects."40
For Edwards the relationship between the will and intellect eventually is
described as being "conjoined in our perception of objects."

Through the

perception of objects the will and intellect, collectively the mind, apprehend
the relations between the mind and the object.

T ruth and goodness are not

discerned by intuition or demonstration by the fallen creature.41 "Truth is
the agreement of our ideas with existence . . . their consistency with
themselves."

Insofar as Edw ards’s whole cosmology is theological tru th is

"an agreement of our ideas with that series in God."42

In scientific

language Edwards describes the process as one of forming concepts, judging
objects, and reasoning about the relations between the concept and the
object.

The key term for Edwards is "relations," for knowledge "is not the

perception of

the

agreement or disagreement of ideas, but rather

the

perception of the union or disunion of ideas, or the perceiving whether two
or more ideas belong to one another."
"relations"

because

something

There is a puzzling aspect to

may be true

39 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 376.

yet a mystery—"we cannot

and

Philosophical

40 Edwards,
"Editor’s Introduction,"
Scientific
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 134.

and

41 Ibid., p. 135.
42 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, pp. 344-345.

and

Philosophical

35

comprehend, or see the manner how the several ideas that belong to the
proposition are united. . . . but we may perceive that they are united and
know that they belong to one another, though we do not know how they
are tied together."43 The ability to discern relations is one of the laws of
individual

wills and

intellects, which it seems varies from

person to

person.44
Edwards in "The Mind," No 67, fu rth er explains the workings of the will,
intellect, understanding, and disposition in a discourse about pleasure and
pain: "pleasure and pain are not properly ideas" even though they "may
imply perception in their nature, yet it does not follow that they are
properly ideas."

The mind does act in discerning pleasure and pain, for

Edwards states that "all acts of the mind about its ideas are not themselves
mere ideas."

This is because "pleasure and pain have their seat in the will,

and not in the understanding."45 Will and choice are "nothing else but the
m ind’s being pleased with an idea, or having a superior pleasedness in
something thought of, or a desire of a fu ture thing, or a pleasedness in the
thought of our union with the thing."46 The understanding at this point in
Edw ards’s thought is not clearly defined.
Edwards defines

Later in the Religious Affections

the understanding as the perceiving, speculating, and

guiding of the soul.
Will, intellect, and understanding are all parts of Edw ards’s psychology
that rests upon his epistemological and metaphysical ideas, which are in
43 Ibid., p. 385.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 384.
46 Ibid.
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turn

tied

to his theological beliefs.

The ideas from which

Edwards

constructs his epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological explanation
of human beings surface in his scientific and philosophical writings, "Of
Being," "Of Atoms," and "The Mind."

At some points he depends upon the

work of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More, at others his ideas stem from
John Locke, and at still others he draws upon the work of Isaac Newton.
In each of these works Edwards scientifically describes phenomena of the
universe.

At each base of explanation, however, lies not a scientific

explanation but a theological belief that places everything w ithin the realm
of

the

omnipresent creator

God.

The

ideas

Edwards

posited

in his

philosophical and scientific writings continued with him throughout his life.
At times he revised his thought and presented something new.

From these

writings one would not suspect that the whole of Edwards’s anthropology
would

emphasize

the

negative

aspects

of

humanity.

Metaphysically,

Edw ards’s concept of human nature is void of all of the contempt he
showered on hum anity when describing human nature based on scripture.

II
The

biblical view

of

human nature

that

Edwards espoused can be

discovered in some of the sermons of the Northampton period, 1726-1751.
His ideas about hum anity are clear in an examination of nine sermons: "God
glorified in Man’s Dependence," "Man’s Natural Blindness, in the things of
Religion," "Men N aturally God’s Enemies," "Justification by Faith Alone,"
"Wicked Men useful in their Destruction only," "Sinners in the hands of an
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Angry God," "A Divine and Supernatural Light . . .

"Natural Men in a

dread fu l Condition," and "Wicked Men Inconsistent with themselves."47
Edw ards’s first published work was the sermon "God Glorified in Man’s
Dependence."

This sermon was given as the Thursday lecture to the

ministers of Boston on July 8, 1731.

If Perry Miller is correct, this sermon

served to draw the lines of the battle that continued for the rem ainder of
the century between Edwards and his followers, and Charles Chauncy,
Jonathan Mayhew, and their followers.48

Edwards named I Corinthians

1:29-31 the text for the sermon and builds upon and expands his belief that
everyone and everything is wholly dependent upon God. The only good that
humans have is "in

and through Christ: He is made unto us

righteousness, sanctification and redemption."49

wisdom,

The only good that the

fallen and redeemed creature has is concerned with these four things.
Through the free gift of Christ and the faith

which the Holy Spirit

nourishes in us by Christ, we discern the dependence of the creature upon
God.
A correlative point
redemption.

Before

in this sermon is that God is glorified in the work of
the Fall, humans cleaved to God for their holiness.

Now, after the fall of Adam and humankind, humans more than ever must
rely upon God’s arbitrary and sovereign good pleasure. Edwards emphasizes
47 For the full text of these sermons see Jonathan
Edwards, The Works of President Jonathan Edwards (1808;
reprint, New York: Leavitt and Allen, 1855), "Worcester
Edition," vol. 4; idem, The Works of Jonathan Edwards
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1865), "Hickman Edition."
48 See Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (1949; reprint,
Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press,
1981), pp. 23-34.
49 Edwards, Works. "Worcester Edition," 4: 62.
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the

fact

that

human

beings are helpless; we have a "helplessness in

ourselves," and "are more apparently dependent on God for holiness, because
we are first sinful, and utterly polluted, and afterw ards holy."50

Though

hum anity is utterly polluted, "we are not only without any true excellency,
but are full of, and wholly defiled with, that which is infinitely odious,"
and the only good we have comes from God.51 God brings the "sinner from
his low state" of the total corruption of his nature, "from the depths of sin
and misery, to such an exalted state of holiness and happiness."52

For

humans to have saving faith "it is necessary" that they "should be emptied"
of themselves and recognize that they are "wretched, and miserable, and
poor, and blind and naked."53

Edwards’s emphasis is clear.

Scripture

shows that the human creature is in a "low, lost and ruined state" and that
the creature is "wholly and universally dependent on God."54

From this

description "it appears that the creature is nothing and that God is all."
Evident in this sermon is Edw ards’s upholding of orthodox Puritanism, the
fall of humanity, its utter depravity, and its dependence upon God for any
good whatsoever.
In the sermon "Man’s N atural Blindness, in the things of Religion,"
published

posthumously,

capacity for religion.

Edwards

speaks

about

human

nature

and

its

With Psalm 94 as the text, Edwards begins by

showing that vanity is common to all.
50 Ibid., p. 172.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 178.
54 Ibid., pp. 176, 177.
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ways of religion "there is an extreme and brutish blindness" in humans.55
"This doctrine," he states, "is not to be understood as any reflection on the
capacity of the human nature; for God hath made man with a noble and
excellent capacity."56 Hum ankind is created with certain natural capacities
and

is "capable of

true

wisdom and

divine

knowledge."57

There

however, a "blindness" in the heart that is a part of human nature.
is the cause of this blindness?

is,

What

Humans are blind not because of a flaw in

their mental faculties or in their ability to know, but because of a positive
cause, the Fall.

Through the Fall, human nature became corrupted, the

heart lost its sight and henceforth is prone to delusion.

The mind became

"exceeding dark" and now is as "contrary as possible to reason."58 There is
a "woeful tendency of the mind of man since the fall, notwithstanding his
noble powers and faculties; even to sink down into a kind of brutality, to
lose and extinguish all useful light, and to sink lower and lower into
darkness."59

Yet, human beings are deceived about their own state.

"think themselves something when they are nothing."60

They

Again Edw ards’s

anthropology rests on a scriptural basis that accentuates the wretched state
of humanity.
Revelation, an aspect of Edwards’s metaphysical description of humanity,
is also tied to his biblical view of human nature.
55 Ibid., p. 17.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 20.
59 Ibid., p. 22.
60 Ibid., p. 26.
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delivered the sermon "A Divine and Supernatural Light" which is based on
Matthew 16:17. In defining the exact nature of the divine and supernatural
light Edwards uses the "via negativa" and tells us what it is not, and by
doing so he reveals an aspect of human nature.

Spiritual light is not "the

conviction of the sin and misery of natural man," or "an impression made
on the imagination," or "the suggesting of any new truths or propositions
not contained in the word of God," nor is it "thought about the things of
religion."61

The

divine

and

supernatural

light

is "a real

sense

and

apprehension of the divine excellency of things revealed in the word of
God."62

Human beings, Edwards stresses, by nature have the capacity to

comprehend this divine emanation.

The divine light comes from God, and

thus we see again that hum ankind is dependent upon God in the things of
religion.
Edw ards’s emphasis on the dependence of the creature upon God led him
on a Sunday in July 1734 to name as his text Ezekiel 15:2-4.

With "Wicked

Men Useful in their Destruction Only" Edwards reiterates the creature’s
dependence upon God in the analogy of the vine.
represented by the vine."

H umanity is "very fitly

Just as the vine is weak in comparison to and

dependent upon "other things which support it," it "well represents to us
what a poor, feeble, dependent creature man is, and how if left to himself,
he must fall into mischief, and cannot help himself."63
Another prominent analogy in this sermon is that of the "chain of being."
Edwards herein shows how humans were given a rational soul to the
61 Ibid., pp. 439-441.
62 Ibid., p. 441.
63 Ibid., p. 300.
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exclusion of the other creatures.64

We are the creature "nearest to God,

of any in this lower world; and therefore [our] business is with God.

Our

superior end then is to serve and glorify God, while our inferior end shows
th at we were "made for one another," made for our "friends and neighbors,
and for the good of the public."65

With these statements one can see that

humans are not totally vile, corrupt, and evil.

Is Edwards contradicting

himself by allowing humans the possibility of doing good?

Edwards is not

contradicting himself, for his explanation of the source of these benevolent
character-istics is consistent with his fundam ental premise that everything
is dependent upon the Creator.

Even though this world is fallen, "and is

under a curse, and is a miserable place to what it once was," it still has
"streams of divine goodness."66

The key term is "divine," for the goodness

is from God and not from humans. The human condition is still inferior.
Edwards explains how fa r the natural human condition fell short in the
sermon "Natural Men in a D readful Condition."

Choosing Acts 16:29-31 as

his text, Edwards shows how at one time humans were a "noble piece of
divine workmanship," but with the Fall they became "dreadfully defaced."67
He decries the fact that "so excellent a creature . . . should be so
ruined."68

As in "Man’s. N atural Blindness," so here the "dreadfulness of

their depravity appears in that humans are sottishly blind and ignorant."69
64 Ibid., p. 301.
65 Ibid., p. 302.
66 Ibid., p. 304.
67 Edwards, Works. "Hickman Edition," p. 817.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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God gave humans a faculty of reason and understanding.

God "exalted"

them above all the other creatures, and with that endowment it became
possible to "know God, and to know spiritual and eternal things."70 After
the Fall, however, the whole of humanity is debased.

H um anity has lost its

glory with respect to knowing God and has "become as ignorant of the
excellency of God as the very beasts."71 The human understanding is now
inundated by darkness.

The human mind is blind.

We are "ignorant" of

God, Christ, the way of salvation, and of our own happiness.72 A "spirit of
atheism" prevails in the hearts of humans.73
Humans are blind and have no goodness because no higher principle than
self-love exists in their hearts.

With nothing but self-love there can be no

"good exercises of heart, never one good thought or motion of heart in
them," especially no love to God.74 Besides self-love, the hearts of humans
are "exceedingly full of sin."

The heart is full of lust to a "dreadful

degree" and is a "mere sink of sin, a fountain of corruption."75 To support
these charges Edwards quotes Mark 7:21,22.

"From within, out of the heart

of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts,
covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy,
pride, foolishness."

In effect, natural humans "are in the image of the

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 818.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
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devil."76

Humanity lost the image of God, yet God graciously restrains

their wickedness, "principally by fear and respect to their credit and
reputation and by education."

And were it not for these restraints, "there

is no wickedness [humans] would not commit."77
state are unconcerned with the future.

Humans in their natural

From external appearances they

might look to be "happy in this world," but they are "truly destitute."78
Hum anity is bereft because the only happy creature is one "who is entitled
to happiness," and the miserable creature is one "who is in danger of
misery," in their "eternal state."

In a natural condition human beings

cannot be happy for they have no "title to any inheritance in another
world."79
Justification, which in Edw ards’s thought is secured by faith alone, shows
that humans can yet be granted the gift of life.
4:5, which states that

Edwards points to Romans

"justification respects a man as ungodly."

He

explains how these words imply that God, "in the act of justification has no
regard to anything in the person justified, as godliness, or any goodness,"
for God looks upon the creature as "ungodly or wicked."

Therefore,

according to Edwards, the natural human prior to justification is abominable
in the eyes of God.

Through God’s gracious act, however, the creature is

justified.80
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 820.
79 Ibid.
80 Edwards, Works. "Worcester Edition," 4: 64-66.
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Until justified, the sinner is under the sway of an infinite guilt "which
arises from the infinite evil or heinousness of sin."

The heinousness of sin

is a result of forsaking an obligation, the obligation to love or respect any
being

"in

proportion

to

the

greatness

or

excellency

of

that

being."81

Accordingly, "if a being be infinitely excellent and lovely [i.e., God], our
obligations to love him are therein infinitely great."82

Because of our

"infinite comparative meanness" since the Fall, humans can only exercise a
finite goodness.83

The obligation the creature owes to the infinite creator

is itself infinite.

Human beings, however, can only put their finite being

into the scales.

For Edwards, then, humans are "still infinitely unworthy

and hateful in God’s sight."84

The infinite sin of the Fall outweighs

whatever finite goodness natural hum anity might have.85
Basing his arguments on scripture, Edwards shows how human beings
are like "filthy swine" wallowing in the mire of their sins, and that
justification by fa ith alone must necessarily come from the infinite God, the
gracious creator.

Edwards, in his biblical view of human nature, continues

as he did in his metaphysical descriptions to ground his thought in the
omnipotent creator. In his biblically based anthropology, however, hum anity
could not be characterized as good.
The sermon, "Wicked Men Inconsistent with themselves," contains both
the metaphysical view and the scripturally based view of humanity.
81 Ibid., p. 74.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., p. 77.
84 Ibid., p. 76.
85 Ibid., p. 131.
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main

emphasis

inconsistent.

of

this

sermon

is to show

how

wicked

hum anity

is

Edwards lists several examples of how humans in their natural

state are inconsistent.

First, the understanding of the creature and the

creature’s end are inconsistent with each other.

This does not mean,

Edwards states emphatically, "that the faculty of reason and understanding
is inconsistent with itself; for the faculty of understanding with which God
has endowed man is wholly good and right."86

The inconsistency lies,

however, in that "the understandings of natural men are perverted by sin"
and therefore, practical judgment is inconsistent with reason, and hence,
some judgments do not agree with others.87
A consequence of this first inconsistency is that the human will disagrees
with

its

reason,

judgment."88

"for

the

will

ever

This has two inferences.

follows

the

dictate

of

practical

First, humans will those things

which their reason tells them are inconsistent with their duty, i.e., their
wills are inconsistent with their consciences.

The "conscience," a principle

implanted in the heart of every human being, is "essential to" their nature
"as the faculty of reason."89 The wills of sinful humans, acting contrary to
their consciences, "choose those things which they know to be evil . . .
th at which their own reason tells them is unreasonable and vile."90

The

divergence between the will and conscience brings forth "an inward war" in
86 Edwards, Works. "Hickman Edition," p. 919.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
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the mind.

In the second instance, wicked human beings "will those things

which their reason tells them are contrary to their own interest."91
Not only is the will at war with the conscience, but it is at odds with
itself.

Edwards characterizes this situation as that of wicked creatures who

wish to be converted from their sinful ways to the way of God, but who
are unwilling to part with their sins; their sins they love too well.92 Next,
he tells how

the

creature’s "outward show disagrees" with

the

heart.

Humans are like wolves in sheep’s clothes, for "many of them profess to
believe that God is an infinitely excellent being, when indeed they think
the meanest of their carnal enjoyments is more excellent than God."93

In

this case the professions of the creatures are not congruent with their
practice.

And likewise, practice disavows their hopes.

practice is inconsistent with itself as well.
honest

"with

respect

to

strict

Sometimes their

For example, some people are

commutative

justice,

but

they

are

not

charitable"—"they are selfish, covetous, close, and unmerciful."94
As if it were not enough for humans to be inconsistent with themselves,
Edwards shows how they are also at war with God.

In the sermon "Men

N aturally God’s Enemies," with Psalm 94:8 as text, Edwards repeats the
dictum that human beings "are or have been sinners," and most of them will
confess that they have bad hearts.95
mean esteem of God."

Unregenerate hum anity has a "very

They have "very low and contemptible thoughts of

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., p. 922.
94 Ibid., p. 925.
95 Edwards, Works. "Worcester Edition," 4: 37.
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God."96

As in "Wicked Men Inconsistent with Themselves" the human will

is contrary to itself.

Not only is the natural hum an’s will at war with

itself, but it is in opposition to the will of God.

In their natural state

humans are "wholly destitute of any principle of love to God."97 They are
as destitute of love of God as a "dead, stiff, cold, corpse is of a vital
heart."98

Again, Edwards states his belief in the natural human principle

of atheism.

Then, returning to his fundam ental premise of the sovereignty

of God, Edwards shows that humans "cannot overcome their own enmity";
they never strive to do so.99

The only way to overcome this absence of

love is through the gracious act of God.
Edw ards’s most famous sermon, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,"
preached on the eve of the Great Awakening, takes as its text Deuteronomy
32:35, "Their foot shall slide in due time."

This sermon portrays humanity

at its worst, and it is sad that most people who know of Jonathan Edwards
know of him only through this sermon, for statements about Edwards’s
theology or anthropology based on this sermon are only an attenuated view
of Edwards.

One cannot deny the power of this tract or the vivid images

it promotes.

God is portrayed as vengeful and sometimes w rathful: God

"holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some
loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his

96 Ibid., p. 38.
97 Ibid., p. 40.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
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wrath towards you burns like fire, he looks upon you as worthy of nothing
else, but to be cast into the fire."100
In "Sinners" Edwards tells how humans are a "burden to the earth."
They are such a burden that "the creation groans," and God looks upon
them as worth nothing but to be cast into hell.101 These statements are in
accord with everything we have discussed in Edwards’s other sermons.

In

comparison with the in finite beauty of God, the natural human is an ugly
creature.
The biblical view of hum anity that Edwards presented in his sermons, like
his metaphysical anthropology, rests upon his fundam ental belief in the
sovereignty of God. Hum anity in this theological anthropology is debased in
every respect.

Human beings are like "filthy worms" with their only good

derived from the all powerful creator, God.

Ill
Edw ards’s published treatises, Religious Affections. Freedom of the
Will. Dissertation on the End in Creation. Nature of True V irtue, and
Original Sin, bring

together his metaphysical and

humanity, sometimes even in the same essay.

scriptural

views of

These works outline the

extent to which he reflected upon the human condition.
Religious A ffections, published in 1746, constitutes Edw ards’s apologetic
for the emotional upheaval of the Great Awakening.

In the Religious

Affections Edwards continues the line of argumentation he set forth in
Distinguishing Marks and Thoughts on the Revival.
100 Ibid., p. 318.
101 Ibid., p. 317.
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these

works

is

"how

shall

the

presence

of

the

divine

Spirit

be

discerned?"102 Many, including Charles Chauncy, had denounced the Great
Awakening and the revivals as spurious expressions of piety.

Edwards

himself questioned the genuineness of some of the affections produced by
the revivals, but never did he think that the Great Awakening was not the
work of God.
Fundam entally,

the

problem

for

Edwards

became

"what

are

the

distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favor with God, and
entitled to his eternal rewards?"
true religion?"103

To answer these questions Edwards investigated the

nature of the affections.
religious affections.

In other words, "what is the nature of

He sought to explain what were true and false

Part and parcel of this explanation for Edwards were

the questions what causes the affections, what is their relationship to the
divine Spirit, and also in what manner are the affections "connected" to the
understanding and will.104
To define the nature of true religion Edwards begins with Scripture, for
he quotes I Peter 1:8, "Whom having not seen, ye love: in whom though
now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable, and full
of glory."

In his exegesis of I Peter, Edwards states that true religion

"consists in holy affections," a love and joy in Jesus Christ.

The affections

102 J o n a th a n
E dw ards,
" E d ito r’s
In tro d u ctio n ,"
Religious Affections, vol. 2 of The Works of Jonathan
Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 1.
103 Edwards, "Author’s Preface,"
vol. 2 of Works, p. 84.
104 E d w ard s,
"E d ito r’s
Affections, vol. 2 of Works, p. 11.

Religious

Introd uction ,"

Affections.
Religious
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of joy in Christ m anifest itself through spiritual insight, are unseen, and
are the f ru it of fa ith .105
What is the nature

of

these affections?

The

affec-tions, Edwards

answers, "are no other, than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of
the inclination and will of the soul."106

They are lively enough to go

beyond indifference, to the point where "the motion of the blood and
animal spirits begins to be sensibly altered," whereupon some change occurs
in the heart.107 True religion and its affections alter the internal sense of
the creature.

For Edwards, the affections ultimately indicate the direction

of the soul, either towards God or the world.

The natural hum an’s

affections are concerned with this world while the affections of the saint
are focused on the divine Spirit.
Both the natural and saintly humans have affections that are the "sensible
exercises" of the will and inclination of the soul.

The soul is the unifying

force in Edwards’s psychology, and as in "The Mind," the soul is "indued"
with two faculties: the understanding and the will.108
John E. Smith, editor of Religious A ffections, in the Yale edition of
Edw ards’s Works, stresses that Edwards continued to follow the points he
outlined

in

"The Mind."

Regarding

the

two faculties,

the will

105 Edwards, Religious Affections, vol. 2 of Works, p.
95.

106 Ibid., p. 96.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., p. 96.
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understanding, Edwards, though he made distinctions, nonetheless argued for
a unifying psychology.109
The origins of Edw ards’s unifying psychology can be found in the
thought of John Locke.

Locke argued against the scholastic psychology

that held that the faculties were distinct agents and form a psychology of
the mind wherein the will and understanding are two powers, not distinct
faculties.

Edwards used Locke as his source but went beyond him and

abolished any differen tiatio n between the powers of the mind.
of the mind for Edwards, however, were not indistinguishable.

The powers
What this

means is that the will and understanding could not oppose each other.110
This stand by Edwards is in direct opposition to the position taken by some
of his Puritan predecessors, who emphasized the distinctions between the
will and understanding in their faculty psychology.111
If Edw ards’s only reason for writing the Affections had been to show
the nature of the affections, he would have ended with Part One, the
psychological description of the human creature.

Edwards, however, was

also concerned with showing how true religion consists in the affections.
God, the author of the human nature, not only indued the human creation
w ith

affections,

actions."112

"but has

made

’em very

much

the

spring

men’s

And "the affections do not only necessarily belong to the

109 E d w ard s,
" E d ito r’s
A ffections, vol. 2 of Works, p. 11.

Introduction,"

Religious

110 Jonathan Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Freedom
of the Will, vol. 1 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957) pp. 49-50.
111 Fiering, "Will and Intellect," pp. 551-558.
112 Edwards, Religious Affections, vol. 2 of Works, p.
100.
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human nature, but are a very great part of it; so . . . holy affections do
not only necessarily belong to true religion, but are a very great part of
that.1'113 Therefore, "as true religion is of a practical nature, and God has
so constituted the human nature, that the affections are very much the
spring of men’s actions, this also shows, that true religion must consist
very much in the affections."114 We see that the human creature would be
inactive, "any otherwise than he is influenced by some affection, either love
or hatred, desire, hope, fear or some other."115

Take these away "and the

world would be, in a great measure, motionless and dead; there would be no
such

thing

as

activity

amongst

mankind,

or

any

earnest

pursuit

whatsoever."116 Consequently, Edwards declares that religion is one of the
fundam ental aspects of human nature.117

There is, however, always the

d ifference between the natural and religious affections, between natural and
regenerate humans.
The distinction made between the natural and saintly human is analogous
to the difference between the terms describing the natural and moral
attributes in humans.

In Part III of the Religious Affections Edwards

summarizes the essence of these terms and their meaning.

Humans can

conceive of two kinds of attributes in God "which are summed up in his
holiness and . . . natural attributes, of strength, knowledge, etc. that
113 Ibid., p. 101.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
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constitute the greatness of God."118

Similarly, there is a corresponding

twofold "imago Dei" in humans: God’s "moral or spiritual image, which is his
holiness, that is the image of God’s moral excellency (which image was lost
by the Fall); and God’s natural image, consisting in men’s reason and
understanding, his natural ability, and dominion over the creatures, which is
the image of God’s natural attributes."119

This twofold distinction echoes

the work of William Ames and continues to reinforce Edwards’s general
supposition of the differences between the natural and regenerate human
and between

God and humans.

Edwards in the Religious Affections

defended the Great Awakening on the basis of his scriptural views within
the context of his metaphysics.

The treatise on the affections shows how

Edw ards’s psychological and theological views came together to form a
unified concept of human nature.
In Freedom of the Will, published in 1754 after he left Northampton,
Edwards continued to base his arguments and anthropology on a synthesis
of his metaphysical, psychological, biblical, and theological views.

Freedom

of the Will, like the Religious Affections, is an apologetic tract.

Edwards

states in the conclusion that Freedom of the Will "obviate[s] some of the
chief objections of Arminians against the Calvinistic doctrine of the total
depravity and corruption of man’s nature."120 The Arminians rejected this
doctrine, which holds that the human heart is "wholly under the power of
sin," making one "utterly unable, without the interposition of sovereign
grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do anything that is truly
118 Ibid., p. 256.
119 Ibid.
120 Edwards, Freedom of the Will, vol. 1 of Works, p. 432.
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good and acceptable in God’s sight,"

for they felt "it is incon-sistent with

the freedom of m an’s will, consisting in indifference and self-determining
power."121

They believed that this doctrine makes human beings "no more

than mere machines."122

They in turn advocated a theory of contin-gency

which Edwards rejected because it gave too much power to the human
creature.123 The theological issue for Edwards, according to Paul Ramsey,
was that "either contingency and the liberty of self-determination must be
run out of this world, or God will be shut out."124
Edw ards’s argument against the Arminian notions of contingency as the
basis of the freedom of the will rests upon two foundations, the proof from
Scripture and the proof from reason.125

The major portion of Edwards’s

tract consists of philosophical and semantic proofs defending his notion of
the freedom of the will.

What Edwards proved on the basis of scripture

reinforces what he had said else-where.
Many times Edwards chides the Arminians for their imprecise use of
language.

In Part I he begins by defining his terms.

the will, he asks.

What is the nature of

"I observe," he states, "that the will . . . is plainly, that

121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., p. 370.
123 For a full discussion of Edwards’s relationship
with the Arminians, see Norman Fiering, Jonathan Edwards’s
Moral Thought and Its British Context (Chapel Hill: U niver
sity of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early
American History and Culture, 1981), pp. 292-305.
124 Edwards, "Editor’s
Will, vol. 1 of Works, p. 9.
125 Ibid., p. 8.
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by which the mind chooses anything."126

From thence Edwards proceeds

through the philosophical argument.
To clarify the discussion, Edwards defines the term "liberty."
liberty

is "power, opportunity,

Freedom or

or advantage" to do as one pleases.127

Freedom of the will means simply acts of volition wherein one is "free from
hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any
respect."128

In other words, a human being is free to do what he or she

wills but not to do what he or she does not will.

Therefore, in any act of

volition the mind or inclination is pleased with one thing rather than
another.129
How does the will choose?

In explaining the will and its processes

Edwards states that the human will "always is as the greatest apparent
good, or as what appears most agreeable, is."130

He says this rather than

the greatest apparent good determines the will or that what seems most
agreeable does.

He does so "because an appearing most agreeable or

pleasing to the mind, and the m ind’s preferring or choosing, seem hardly to
be properly and perfectly distinct."131

What then determines the will?

Initially, Edwards states that the will is always determined by the strongest
motive.132

He later qualifies this statement with "or by that view of the

126 Edwards, Freedom of the Will, vol. 1 of Works, p. 137.
127 Ibid., p. 163.
128 Ibid., p. 163.
129 Ibid., p. 140.
130 Ibid., p. 144.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., p. 148.
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mind

which

has

the

greatest

degree

of

previous

tendency

volition."133 The will determines an act by willing and choosing.

to

excite
Humans

have the ability to choose as they please under this explanation.134
The Arminians, however, could not see how the Calvinist doctrines
allowed this capacity.

They felt that Calvinism bound the will and that it

therefore could not be held accountable.

Edwards denies the Arminian

objection and shows that the will is worthy of praise and blame.
Building upon his explanation of the connection between the will and
any action going fo rth from it, Edwards states that "when a thing is from a
man, . . . that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it, because
his will is in it: so fa r is the will in it. blame is in it. and no further."135
Human actions are subject to moral and ethical judgment "not so properly
because they are from us, as because we are in them. . . . not so much
because they are from some property of ours, as because they are our
properties."136

Actions are a property of the human nature guided by the

soul and the will.

For the "soul of virtue and vice," praiseworthiness or

blameworthiness is "a certain beauty or deform ity that [is] inherent in that
good or evil will."137
If moral accountability relies upon an inherent attribute, then is the will
independent and self-moved as the Arminians believed?
with an emphatic no.

Paul Ramsey points out that causation is the central

133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., pp. 161, 190, 193.
135 Ibid., p. 427.
136 Ibid., p. 428.
137 Ibid., p. 340.
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focus of Freedom of the Will.138

Edwards defines causation as "that

whatsoever begins to be, which before was not, must have a cause why it
then

begins

to

exist."139

Inherent

in

this

explanation

is

refu tatio n of the Arminian notion of the self-determined will.

Edwards’s
Edwards

"can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the soul’s having power
to cause and determine its own volitions, as a being to whom God has
given a power of action, but this; that God has given power to the soul,
sometimes at least, to excite volitions at its pleasure or accord as it
chooses."140
Another point of Freedom of the Will that is relevant to Edwards’s
anthropology concerns the refutation of the Arminian notion of freedom and
liberty.

The Arm inian position is clear to Edwards: the more the soul has

"disengagedness in its actings, the more liberty"; the more liberty, the
greater the disinterestedness, and if the soul has perfect liberty, then, as
Edwards

points

responsible.141

out,

it

is completely

Here Edwards

turns

disengaged

and

cannot be held

the table on the Arminians, who

themselves objected to the Calvinist doctrines for not allowing room for
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.

If humans do not will according to

the dictates of reason, the agreeableness of the good to them, and from
their own dispositions and characters, it is not choice that determines their
actions but "it is therefore a contingence, that happens to the man, arising
138 Edwards, "Editor’s
Will, vol. 1 of Works, p. 24.
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139 Edwards, Freedom of the Will, vol. 1 of Works, p. 181.
140 Ibid., p. 189.
141 Ibid., p. 272.
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from nothing in him."142
notion

of

freedom

Therefore, according to Edwards, the Arm inian

is not

freedom

at

all,

for

if

freedom

is only

contingency, humans could not be praised or blamed for their actions.
Contingency is anathema to Edwards, for there is an "universal sense" of
hum ankind that there is sincerity of virtue only in "actions which proceed
from a heart well disposed and inclined," and the greater the virtue "the
stronger, and

more fixed

and determined

the good disposition of the

heart."143 Fundam entally, Edwards argues for the freedom of the will and
in turn the freedom of the person with respect to its act of volition.
These acts are worthy of praise or blame because they are properties of
the human nature.

Accordingly, virtue is a "quality of mind."144

The

amount of virtue a person has is in direct proportion to the inherent
disposition of the mind.
Edwards probes deeper into the subject of virtue in the second essay of a
two-essay work.

In the first essay, entitled Dissertation Concerning the

End for which God Created the World. Edwards deals, as the title suggests,
with the reasons for God’s creating the world.

The second essay, The

N ature of True Virtue, focuses on the human side and expounds Edw ards’s
form

of

Calvinism,

Christian

ethics,

and

understanding

of

Testament commandment of love.145
142 Ibid., p. 326.
143 Ibid., p. 321.
144 Ibid., p. 325.
145 Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of
foreword by William K. Frankena (1765)
U niversity of Michigan Press, 1960), p. viii.
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The N ature of True V irtue, written in 1755 but not published until 1765,
seven years after Edwards’s death, focuses on the virtue of the human
creature.

Edw ards’s fundam ental supposition rests not in reason but in

sentiment.

Moral judgments, virtue, and vice find approval or disapproval

in the sentiments among humankind.

The "sensible" notion that Edwards

introduces in the sermon "God Glorified in Man’s Dependence" resurfaces.
Edwards identifies sense in the human realm with a sense of beauty, i.e., a
sense

wherein

perception.

pleasure

is immediately

perceived

from

the objects

of

V irtue in this instance reflects a type of beauty, a beauty of

the heart.146
There are two kinds of beauty: beauty of disposition and beauty of
action, and there are two corresponding senses by which they are relished.
Prim ary beauty, the highest, true, spiritual and divine beauty, consists of
benevolence or love of Being in general.
relishes this type of beauty.

Only a spiritual or divine sense

The secondary, infe-rior, or natural beauty,

perceived by a "fleshy" natural sense, reveals itself in harmony, proportion,
and uniform ity.147
Because virtue corresponds to beauty there are two types of virtue: virtue
and true virtue.

True virtue consists in primary beauty.

good will to Being in general.

It is consent and

In other words, Edwards explains true virtue

to be "love of intelligent Being in general," for "beings that have no
perception or will . . . are not properly capable objects of benevolence."148
V irtue concerns itself with intelligent beings loving in proportion to their
146 Ibid., pp. viii, ix.
147 Ibid.
148 Edwards, Works. "Worcester Edition," 2: 263.
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dignity, their degree of existence, and the extent to which they love Being
as Being.149

"To

speak more accurately," Edwards

states, "it is that

consent, propensity

and union of heart to being in

general which is

immediately exercised in a general good will."150

Because God is infinite,

both in dignity and existence, then true virtue is essentially love of God,
"the Being of beings, infinitely the greatest and best."151
humans consists of
virtuous

being.

necessarily

have

True virtue in

benevolence to being in general, and benevolence to

Therefore,

any human

a

loveto

supreme

God,

being with
both

of

true virtue

"must

benevolence

and

complacence."152
The natural creature does

not have this divine sense.

Humans,

the

inferior creatures, have a notion of a form of excellence but not true
virtue.

Biasically, humans inherently rely on a sense of justice, which is no

more than "a relish of uniform ity and proportion" that involves no true
virtue.

This sense of justice combines common morality with a love of

consistency and reflects the conscience of each human.
does not have its roots in

A sense of justice

love to Being in general but lies in

"an

inclination to feel and act as one with ourselves," and therefore reflects
not true virtue but self-love.153
Humans, however, Edwards points out, have a "moral sense that is natural
149 Edwards, True V irtue, p. 3.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., p. 14.
152 Ibid., p. 15.
153 Ibid., pp. x, xi.
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to all."154

This moral sense "consists in a natural relish of the beauty of

true virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue implanted by
nature in the hearts of all."155 They also have a natural conscience which
consists of two parts: a "disposition to approve or disprove" and "a natural
agreement, proportion and harmony, between malevolence or injury, and
resentment and

punishment."156

Through the workings of the natural

conscience humans are able to discern and "will approve of true virtue and
condemn the want of it, and opposition to it."157 If the human conscience
is "fully enlightened, . . . delivered from being confined to a private sphere,
and brought to view and consider things in general, and delivered from
being stupified by sensual objects and appetites, as they will be at the day
of judgment, they will approve nothing but true virtue."158
The general nature of true virtue is love.
a love of God.

It is love to Being in general,

In his introduction to The Great Christian Doctrine of

Original Sin Defended. Clyde A. Holbrook summarizes Edw ards’s depiction of
the human relationship to true virtue:
A truly virtuous deed involves the heart of man, his inclination to
savor the divine riches, but the heart can have no tendency to make it
self better, till it begins to have a better tendency.
And this is
precisely the essential factor in true virtue, which is quite beyond the
capacity of the self to achieve.159
154 Ibid., p. 52.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid., p. 65.
157 Ibid., p. 69.
158 Ibid.
159 Jonathan Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Original
Sin, vol. 3 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1970), p. 37.
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U nderlying

these words about the human capacity for

true virtue is

Edw ards’s defense of the doctrine of original sin and the depravity of the
hum an nature.
Original Sin, published in 1758, the year Edwards died, completes
Edw ards’s theological anthropology.

The controversy

over the precise

essence of the human nature, whether depraved or not, is much too complex
to recount the vicissitudes of the argument that preceded Edwards.160
Suffice it to say that the doctrine of original sin defaced the image of
hum anity that the Enlightenment in the clear light of reason developed.
Edwards stepped into the battle as defender of the "hated doctrine," the
champion

of an

orthodox dogma that

was being attacked

in Europe,

England, and America in the eighteenth century.161
Edwards

wrote

Scripture-Doctrine
Exam ination.162

chiefly
of

in

Original

opposition
Sin.

to

Proposed

John
to

Taylor’s

Free

and

The

Candid

Edwards’s defense rests upon three pillars: first, that all

humans, throughout all time and ages "without fail in any one instance, run
into that moral evil, which is in effect their own utter and eternal
perdition"; second, the explication of this fact lies in and was precipitated
by the fall of Adam; and third, that God, though sovereign in all things,
could

not

be charged

with

being

the

author

of

human

depravity.163

Edwards propounds these positions on original sin solely in terms of the
160 For a full discussion please see H. Shelton Smith,
Changing Conceptions of Original Sin: A Study in American
Theology Since 1750 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955).
161 Edwards,
"Editor’s
vol. 3 of Works, p. 1.
162 Ibid., p. 3.
163 Ibid., p. 26.
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n atural human without the interposition of divine grace.

He implied that

his opponents spoke about the human creation which had received divine
grace.

From

Edw ards’s

standpoint,

however,

scripture

and

human

experience taught that hum ankind is depraved and that hum anity flourishes
in its baseness.164
The plight of the human condition, sin, inaugurated by Adam, is a
function of membership "in a history of human conduct."165 In Original Sin
Edwards develops a "historical notion of human nature in which it is the
history of the race that assumes a unified metaphysical identity."166

In

Edw ards’s history, humans originally possessed two sets of principles: the
inferior, natural principle of mere human nature, which is self-love, and the
superior, divine principle, being the spiritual image of God.
necessary for the happiness of the human nature.
humans had

Both are

Before the fall of Adam,

a supernatural sense, but when Adam sinned the divine

principles were withdrawn.

The inferior principles consequently became the

reigning principles and self-love now dominates.167

Humans share with

Adam an inclination or a principle of human action that conveys a moral
responsibility.168
transgressions.

H um ankind

sinned

in

Adam

and

continues

in

its

Humanity fell short of the moral law given by God, and,

164 Ibid., p. 30.
165 David Weddle, "Jonathan Edwards on Men and Trees,
and the Problem of Solidarity." H arvard Theological Review
67 (1974): 175.
166 Ibid., p. 157.
167 Thomas A. Schafer, "The Concept of Being in the
Thought of Jonathan Edwards" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University,
1951), p. 244.
168 Ibid., p. 174.
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therefore, human beings fail to possess a "relish" and "taste" for the divine
and supernatural things.169
The human condition subsists in "moral depravity." Evil and pernicious is
the state of human nature.170 For the natural state of the human mind is
"attended with a propensity of nature" to sin.171

Therefore, hum anity is

"corrupt and depraved with a moral depravity, that amounts to and implies
their utter undoing."172

Edwards cites scripture: I Kings 8:46, Ecclesiastes

7:20, and Job 9:2-3 and concludes that every human being who is capable of
acting

as

a

moral

agent

is

guilty

of

sin.173

Then

he

calls

upon

Deuteronomy 3:22 and Galatians 3:10 to support the claim that sin is
universal.174

The propensity of all hum ankind to sin belongs to their

nature because sin is observed in hum ankind in general.175

Humankind

exists "naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this
consequence or issue, that they universally are the subjects of that guilt
and sinfulness, which is, in effect, their utter and eternal ruin, being cast
wholly out of the favour of God, and subjected to his everlasting wrath and
169 Edwards,
"Editor’s
vol. 3 of Works, p. 36.
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172 Ibid., p. 113.
173 Ibid., p. 114.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., p. 125.
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curse," death.176 The "universal reign of death" proves the sinful nature of
all humans.177
But is it human nature to sin? Edwards explains,
If any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper
place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in the universe, it
is of an evil nature. That part of the system is not good, which is not
good in its place in the system: and those inherent qualities of that
part of the system, which are not good, but corrupt, in that place, are
not justly looked upon as evil inherent qualities. That propensity is
truly esteemed to belong to the nature of any being, or to be inherent
in it, that is the necessary consequence of its nature, considered
together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence,
whether that propensity be good or bad.178
H um ankind then, is evil in its natural state, yet Edwards finds goodness
in the human creature as well.

One of the objections raised to the

doctrine of original sin is that it "pours contempt upon the human n ature."
Edw ards’s response states that "no contempt is by this doctrine cast upon
the noble faculties and capacities of man’s nature, or the exalted business,
and divine and immortal happiness he is made capable of."179
words in this passage are the last three, "made capable of."

The key

Despite all of

the evil characteristics of human nature there exists a flicker of divine
goodness.

Edw ards’s anthropology, comprising his metaphysical and scriptural ideas
about human nature, stresses the negative characteristics of human beings.
176 Ibid., p. 119.
177 Ibid., p. 206.
178 Ibid., p. 125.
179 Ibid., p. 423.
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If looked at by themselves, however, Edwards’s metaphysical ideas would
not lead one to conclude that hum anity is base.

How does one square this

positive outlook with the negative conception of hum anity that emerges
from his anthropology based on scripture?

First and foremost, Edw ards’s

metaphysical and biblical ideas about hum anity are not opposing viewpoints.
That one is positive and the other negative does not mean that they
conflict.

The epistemological and metaphysical explanations Edwards posits

fall into line with his scriptural beliefs.

For at the center of Edwards’s

world rests a theological belief in the sovereignty of God.

Fundam entally,

his ideas, be they epistemological, metaphysical, or scriptural, all return to
this premise.

It was characteristic of a Puritan to theologically declare

humans impotent, while at the same time to admit psychologically that
hum ankind was quite capable of doing the good. In this sense Edwards was
a true Puritan.
As

Samuel

anthropologies

Willard
of

late

and

John

seventeenth

Wise
and

are

examples

early

of

the

Puritan

eighteenth-century

New

England, Jonathan Edwards emerges in the mid-eighteenth century as a
defender of orthodox Puritanism.

His metaphysical view of humankind,

however, goes beyond earlier Puritan views in its adoption of Newtonian
science and Lockean psychology.
entirely orthodox.

The biblical aspect of his anthropology is

Though he denies the label of "Calvinist" in Freedom of

the Will. Edwards defends the main tenets of Calvin, for he subscribes to
the

orthodox

depravity.
time

doctrines

of

divine

sovereignty,

original

sin,

and

total

The fact that his anthropology is orthodox, while at the same

incorporating

the

new

science and

psychology of

century, makes Jonathan Edw ards’s anthropology unique.

the eighteenth

The Benevolence of the Deity:
Jonathan Mayhew and Charles Chauncy
While Jonathan Edwards is best described as one who attempts to
re-ground

New England in orthodox Puritanism, Charles Chauncy and

Jonathan Mayhew, following in the tradition of John Wise, embraced the
Enlightenm ent’s emphasis on reason and questioned the orthodoxy of their
forebears.

I
Jonathan Mayhew, minister of West Church in Boston from 1747 to
1766, explicated an anthropology that emphasizes the rational strain of
Puritanism.

The concept of human nature that is apparent in Mayhew’s

sermons describes human beings as innately neither good nor evil but
endowed unequally with the capacity of reason.
Whereas the theology and anthropology of Edwards revolves around the
fundam ental precept of the sovereignty of God, Mayhew’s theology, centers
on the goodness of God.

Mayhew states that the benevolence of the

creator is the focus of Christian revelation and that any description of a
w rathful God was improper. Mayhew’s description of creation depicts God’s
acts as rational.

These acts are comprehen-sible by the human mind and

they disclose the goodness of God.

The implications of this are twofold:

first, humans can know the nature of God through the works of God, i.e.,
on the basis of what exists in nature human beings can discern the essence
67
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of God without the assistance of revelation; second, this world in turn is
the best of all possible worlds.1

Mayhew’s belief in the goodness of God

stands in stark contrast to Edw ards’s defense of the orthodox Puritan view
of a God of divine sovereignty.

This fundam ental difference led each to

espouse contrasting anthropologies.
Mayhew’s insistence on God’s goodness led him to preach a gospel that
flatly rejected the orthodox doctrine of native depravity.2

Instead of

preaching orthodox Puritan doctrine, he preached a gospel of "supernatural
rationalism" and individualism.3
rational religion.

He expounded a liberal, natural, and

Therefore, the doctrines of original sin, innate depravity,

and predestination are not the focus of the thought of Mayhew.

Though

Mayhew abhorred orthodox Puritan doctrine, he in essence remained a true
Puritan because he detested prelatic institutions and was versed in scripture
enough to follow in the footsteps of traditional Puritan piety.4
James Jones in The Shattered Synthesis claims that John Norton opened
the door for the humanism that Mayhew preached and that as a result "in
Mayhew the Ramist tradition, and all of Puritanism with it, degenerates into
moralism."5 The support for such an argument lies in Mayhew’s theological
1 James Jones, The Shattered Synthesis: New England
Puritanism Before the Great Awakening (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973), pp. 145-146.
2 H. Shelton Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original
Sin: A Study in American Theology Since 1750 (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955), p. 22.
3 John A. Corrigan, "Religion and the Social Theories
of Charles Chauncy and Jonathan Mayhew." (Ph.D. diss.
University of Chicago, 1982), p. 12.
4 Merle Curti, Human Nature in American Thought
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 77-78.
5 Jones, The Shattered Synthesis, p. 160.
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assertion of the benevolence of God.

Mayhew correlated the manifestation

of God’s goodness with the belief that its intent was to make human beings
happy.

Consequently, this is the best of all possible worlds.

This world of

n atural and moral spheres in which humans live is "under the same common
direction or government."

God’s end in this and all things, "however

various and diverse, is really one and uniform."

The end of God’s creation

is "the moral perfection and happiness of the creatures capable of it, or the
glory of God; which in any good and intelligent sense, seems to amount to
the same thing."6
Jonathan Edw ards’s answer to the question, what is the end of humankind
and the end of creation seems at first glance, at least semantically, to be
the same as Mayhew’s answer: the glory of God and God’s goodness.
closer

comparison

reveals

a

paradigmatic

difference.

A

Edw ards’s

understanding of the glory and goodness of God is only manifest as the
happiness of the human creature insofar as it is the happiness of God, and
if God’s supreme end, God’s own pleasure, is to make hum ankind happy,
then so be it.

But the chief end of God, according to Jonathan Edwards, is

not the happiness of humanity.

The supreme difference between the

theology and anthropology of these two Puritan divines rests in their world
views.

Edwards subscribed to a theocentric world view wherein God is the

center and focus of everything; Mayhew advocated an anthropocentric
concept that placed hum ankind in an elevated position wherein God can be
described as responding to human desires.

6 Jonathan Mayhew, The Expected Dissolution of All
Things. A Motive to Universal Holiness (Boston: Edes & Gill
and R. Draper, 1755), p. 59.
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A question that arises with either explanation is how does one explain
evil in

the world?

Some of Edwards opponents pointed

out that

a

theocentric theology and anthropology would make God the author of human
sin and depravity.
active author of sin.

Edwards flatly rejected this notion.

God is not the

Sin is not the result of a "positive influence" by God

nor is it "infused" into human nature.7

God merely permits sin to enter

this world and hum ankind to be depraved. Mayhew’s response to a question
about the nature of evil is to return to his precept of the goodness of God
and the consequent happiness for human beings.

Human beings in their

present state "actually need trials and afflictions, as a means of promoting
their moral good, and future happiness."8 Evil, then, exists for the good of
humanity.
Mayhew’s belief in the goodness of God made it impossible for him to
accept the doctrines of original sin, innate depravity, and predestination.
"If any persons really hold such a doctrine,"

Mayhew asks, how can they

"reconcile [it] with the goodness of God?"9

This doctrine is "most false

and unscriptural, horrible to the last degree, to all men of an undepraved
judgment, and blasphemous against the God of heaven and earth."
impossible

for

anyone

"who really

believes what

the

Scriptures

It is
teach

concerning the goodness of God even to think" of these doctrines "but with
7 For a more complete discussion of this topic see
Jonathan Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Original Sin,
vol. 3 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven: Yale
U niversity Press, 1970), pp. 41-64; H. Shelton Smith,
Changing Conceptions. Chap. 1.
8 Jonathan Mayhew, Two Sermons on the Nature. Extent
and Perfection of the Divine Goodness (Boston: D & J
Kneeland, 1763), p. 58.
9 Ibid., p. 66.
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great indignation."10 Mayhew’s insistence on the goodness of God led him
to disavow these fundam ental Puritan doctrines and instead profess an
anthropology that is d ifferen t from that of Edwards.

Edwards described

hum ankind as depraved; Mayhew could not do so.
The theology of Mayhew, if pursued fu rth er with respect to salvation,
reveals its anthropocentric character.

Mayhew espoused a governmental

theory of atonement and a theory of salvation wherein human creatures
save themselves.

Their sins are atoned for and they are assured of their

salvation through obedience to the commands of Christ.

Mayhew described

humans as being the active authors of their own salvation.11 For Edwards
and orthodox Puritanism this was anathem a—sinners could not be saved by
any initiation of their own.

Human beings are active in orthodox Puritan

theology but only in the sense that they respond to the stirrings of grace
that God imparts to them.
In Seven Sermons . . . Preached as a Lecture in the West Meeting
House

(1750), Mayhew’s first published

work,

he

made clear

that

he

abhorred the doctrine of natural depravity and disagreed with the orthodox
theories of atonement and salvation.

One reason Mayhew dissented from

orthodox opinion was because it did not allow for the natural capacities of
the human being, specifically, the ability of all human beings to discern the
tru th of a proposition by means of natural reason.

Humans are able to

perceive the "natural" difference between right and wrong because "truth
and moral rectitude are things fixed, stable and uniform; having their

10 Ibid.
11 Jones, The Shattered Synthesis, pp. 153-154.
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foundation in the nature of things."12

Through their rational nature and

free will Mayhew depicts humans as having the ability to choose one
proposition over another.
Right

and

wrong,

truth

and

moral

propositions that exist in this world.
God’s world.

rectitude

are

fixed

and

stable

The world in which humans live is

God upholds, rules, controls it and, "in some way or other,

perhaps inconceivable by us, actually orders and determines the events of
it."13 The origin of all events is God’s will.

God’s will, the purposefulness

of nature, is coterminous with the harmony, coherence, and consistence of
the universe.

The plan God has for the world, however, is not always

comprehensible by the human understanding.

God’s works at times can be

so "marvelous" that "we cannot penetrate into, or fully comprehend them,
by reason of the narrowness of our faculties . . . and it is but a little way
that we can see into the nature and causes and reasons of things."14 It is
"infinitely absurd to imagine" that humans with "such limited capacities . . .
should be able to fully comprehend the immense designs and works of an
in fin ite being."15 This explanation upholds the abilities of human beings as
they exist w ithin the realm of God’s world.
Mayhew’s statement about the "circumstances and events" of life reflects
his world view which made the most of human capacities while still
12 Jonathan Mayhew, Seven Sermons (Boston: Rogers and
Fowle, 1749), p. 18.
13 Jonathan Mayhew, Two Discourses Delivered November
23d 1758 (Boston: Draper, for Edes & Gill and Green &
Russell, 1758), pp. 36-37.
14 Jonathan Mayhew, A Discourse on Revelation XV. 3d.
4th (Boston: Edes & Gill and R. Draper, 1755), pp. 22-23.
15 Mayhew, Expected Dissolution, p. 28.
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assenting to the dominion of God.

The events of life, he states, "must be

ascribed

providence,

at

last

to

that

over-rules all things."16

divine

which

superintends

and

The popular analogy that Mayhew resorts to is

"the fabulous golden chain of the poets."

This golden chain is "hung down

from heaven to earth; the upper end whereof is fa r above mortal reach and
sight, and there fastened to the throne of God."17

God in this schema

governs the moral good and evil of the natural world.
human

creature,

being

finite,

"cannot

see

into

The insight of the

the

connections

and

dependences of things and events in the moral world."18 Yet, humans "do,
or may know so much, both of him and them, as may serve the ends of
practical religion; which is the end of man."19

Since practical religion is

the end for human beings, they "have a religious sense" of God’s "wisdom,
power and goodness, and of the obligations which we are under."20 Human
beings have the ability to discern their place in the universe.
The human understanding "holds the same rank in the order of beings" as
does the body in the material universe.

And the only knowledge that

human beings can attain reflects the middling position that humans hold
between God and the brute creatures.

Human beings are endowed w ith a

faculty of reason that the brute creatures do not have, but humans do not
have the complete reason of God.

Knowledge in Mayhew’s psychology

allows humans to "discern somewhat of the middle of things, under an
16 Jonathan Mayhew, Two Discourses Delivered October
9th 1760 (Boston: n.p., 1760), p. 19.
17 Ibid.
18 Mayhew, Discourse on Revelation, p. 30.
19 Ibid., p. 32.
20 Ibid., p. 59.
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eternal Despair of comprehending either their Beginning or the End.*'
middle

state

of

knowledge

is

a

condition

that

describes

all

This

human

faculties--"our senses can bear no extremes, too much noise or too much
light are equally fatal; and make us deaf or blind: Too great Distance or
too great nearness do alike hinder a Prospect and etc."

Such is the proper

place of the human creature that "confines all our Attainments within
certain limits we can never pass."21
The human method of reasoning also reflects the middling position.
Essentially, Mayhew depicts reasoning as keeping an open mind.

It is

im portant to let the mind "lie in equilibrio" in order for one to judge
"solely by reason and argument."22

The "Sobriety of the mind," this

"medium," corresponds to the Puritan sense of the dialectical.

It is founded

in a belief in God’s being and perfection, moral governance, and universal
providence.

In other words, it is agreeable to natural reason and expresses

the revelations of Holy Scripture.23

This dialectic between scripture and

natural reason is not a contradiction since each confirms and helps to
illustrate the other.

Mayhew’s use of the dialectic between biblical truths

and natural reason is a manifestation of his Puritan heritage.
Like every orthodox Puritan, Jonathan Mayhew adhered to the idea of
justification by faith.

However, he was not content with "faith" as it was

expressed by some of his forebears.

Mayhew advocated faith in the one

and supreme God. He supported an expanded meaning of faith that included
21 The inform ation in this paragraph is from the Mayhew
Papers, Boston University, Folder 10, pp. 6-7, as found in
Corrigan, "Social Theories," p. 141.
22 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, p. 42.
23 Jonathan Mayhew, Christian Sobriety (Boston: R. & S.
Draper, 1763), p. 50.
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acts of repentance and obedience that the Christian performs as faith
increased.24
be lost.

To an extent the contrast between faith and works seems to

Mayhew speaks of faith and works as mutually dependent upon

each other, for "the necessity of the former arises only from the necessity
of the latter."

Works in Mayhew’s theology are pronounced as being

"whatsoever is necessary, in order to our being at peace with God."

Faith

in turn is merely the "uprightness of heart" or a freedom from habitual
sinning.25

This follows upon Mayhew’s explanation of knowledge and

reason both w ithin a mutually concerned dialectic wherein the human aspect
is fitly represented as the middle ground.
Jonathan Mayhew, in the tradition of the Puritan propensity for the
dialectical, upheld the dialectic between good and evil in the soul of human
beings, but the emphasis was different.

In Seven Sermons Mayhew’s

thought is divided into three distinct propositions: 1) that there exists a
distinct natural difference between right and wrong, good and evil, 2) that
human

beings,

endowed

with

certain

faculties,

e.g.,

reason

and

understanding, can judge and discern the difference between right and
wrong, and 3) that humans are obliged to exert these faculties and to judge
for themselves.26

A corollary to the third point is that all Christians

should read the Bible and judge for themselves in matters of religion.
A question arises in Mayhew’s mind when the difference between right
and wrong is described as being clearly distinct: why do some human beings
choose wrong; why do they choose to do evil?

As did Edwards, Mayhew

24 Corrigan, "Social Theories," p. 147.
25 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, pp. 109, 215, 327.
26 Corrigan, "Social Theories," p. 150.
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answers that the difficulty lies in the fact that "in some cases" it is hard
"to determine the boundaries."

Sometimes things are "so intricate and

complicated, that it is difficult, or even impossible, to determine them."27
The world in this system of thought then, can be both good and evil and so
it is—"But alas! there is never any great good in

this present evil world

without some mixture of evil, at least if what seems to us to be so."28
This leads to a fu rth er question, one which Mayhew did not address.

If a

theology is centered on or backed by the goodness of the creator God and
this is the best of all possible worlds because the end of God and humanity
is then happiness, why is the present world evil?

Mayhew could have

answered this question as Charles Chauncy did, that the world fell with
Adam and that sin now abounds, but he simply did not address the issue.
The inherent nature of humanity can be maintained as in the way of the
middle ground, neither good nor evil, by asserting that we are not born
morally

depraved but

with

an

imperfect nature.

Yet,

what are

the

implications when one asserts a theology of salvation, as Mayhew does,
wherein the sinner saves his or her own life?
orthodox Puritan
Willard?

such

as Jonathan

What would this mean to an

Edwards,

John

Cotton,

or Samuel

The implications of Mayhew’s theology as a result of a subtle

change in emphasis in the dialectic between good and evil are that the
world is no longer Godcentered but human-centered.

The world view is no

longer theocentric; it is anthropocentric, for the emphasis lies on the
happiness of humanity.

27 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, pp. 13, 16.
28 Jonathan Mayhew, Two
(Boston: R. Draper, 1759), p. 63.
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Mayhew’s advocacy of a dialectic of the middle ground between good and
evil and between faith and works can also be seen in his description of the
Great Awakening.

The reason and the affections, the head and the heart,

were out of balance, according to Mayhew. He felt that the revivals placed
too much importance upon the affections.

Though Mayhew joined the great

debate over the significance of the revivals only nominally he still referred
to the "vain Enthusiasts" as "enlightened Ideots" who "endeavour to palm
the grossest absurdities upon their neighbours, under the notion of their
being divine truths and holy mysteries."29
Mayhew then offers a paean to reason: "It is by our reason that we
are exalted above the beasts of the field.

It is by this that we are allied

to angels, and all the glorious intelligence of the heavenly world; yea, by
this we resemble God himself."30
reason but only in so far as
equilibrium.

Mayhew’s sympathies clearly lay with

to return the

things of religion toa state of

The affections had upset the balance between the

heart and

head in the things of religion.
The source for Jonathan Mayhew’s middle ground was his subscription to
the faculty psychology of Puritanism. Mayhew’s psychology grounded in the
distinct faculties of the soul holds that "the Heart has its Arguments and
motives, with which the Reason is not acquainted."

The heart, according to

Mayhew, and not the reason contains the "perception of God."31
affections in turn are the proper seat of religious thankfulness.
29 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, p. 39.
30 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
31 The inform ation in this paragraph is from the Mayhew
Papers, Boston University, Folder 10, pp. 7-8, as quoted by
Corrigan, "Social Theories," p. 153.
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thankfulness is d ifferen t from "the mere sensation of joy or account of the
blessing received."

It is also distinguished from "a mere speculative notion

in the head, and all the operations of that which is peculiarly and strictly
called, the intellectual or rational faculty."32

What is religion and from

where does it arise, the heart or the reason?
Religion is a passion and passions are from God, but it is a passion
"excited by reason presenting the proper object of it to the mind."

With

the experience of the Great Awakening present in his thoughts Mayhew
returns to his idea of the middle ground and explains how religion is really
a m ixture of the heart and the reason. We ought not to
be so solicitous about avoiding one extreme, as to fall into the contrary.
We ought not to run so fa r from enthusiasm, as to lose sight of real
direction; we ought not to be so fond of a rational religion, as to
suppose that religion consists wholly in cold, dry speculation, without
having any concern for the affections.33
Religion, according to Mayhew, requires both the heart and the reason to
be in balance.
To claim that Mayhew advocated reason over the heart and the affections
would be incorrect.

Reason, however, does play an increasingly important

role in Jonathan Mayhew’s theology and anthropology.

Mayhew read the

works of Dr. Samuel Clarke and Bishop Benjamin Hoadley and pointed out
the place of reason in a world that he felt had forsaken reason.

He did

not preach a gospel that appealed to and excited one’s affections; he would
not dangle his parishioners over the fire pit of hell.

Mayhew noted the

fact that human beings are "certainly weak, indigent creatures" and that
indeed humans are "in some degree conscious of their own imperfection,"
32 Mayhew, Two Discourses Delivered November 23d 1758.
p. 41.
33 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, p. 95.
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but he assured his congregation that they could distinguish between right
and wrong with their own faculty of reason.34

Humans are weak and

ignorant on one hand, but on the other they are also quite capable of
goodness.

More often than not Mayhew emphasizes the essential goodness

of human nature.

Mayhew’s sermons reflect this fact in that he attempted

to persuade his parishioners by appealing to their reason in setting concrete
examples of fact before them.

For instance, he set ominous natural events

such as earthquakes and fires before them as a means of persuading the
human reason rather than exciting the affections.

Earthquakes and fires

were proof of the power of God and were "indeed very peculiarly adapted
to rouse and awaken the minds of the inconsiderate, and if those who
forget God; and to beget in them that fear him, which is the beginning of
wisdom."35
Jonathan Mayhew thus espoused a d ifferen t anthropology from that of
Edwards.

Edwards believed in the innate depravity of hum ankind and

showed how humans could not do anything for their salvation, while
Mayhew argued against an innate depravity of hum anity and stressed the
goodness of the human in reference to reason.

In Mayhew’s eyes human

beings are essentially good and, if they would follow their reason, they
might combine fa ith with works to earn their salvation.
anthropology of Jonathan

Mayhew is the theocentric

Absent from the
world view that

Jonathan Edwards proclaimed.
34 Jonathan Mayhew, A Sermon preached at Boston in New
England. Mav 26. 1751. Occasioned bv the much-lamented death
of His Roval Highness Frederick. Prince of Wales (Boston: R.
Draper and D. Gookin, 1751), p. 5; Smith, Changing Concep
tions. p. 25.
35 Mayhew, Discourse on Revelation, p. 51.
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II

Similar to the anthropology of Mayhew is that of Charles Chauncy.
Chauncy, like Mayhew combined the human-istic ideas of the eighteenth
century with Puritanism and, like Mayhew, placed emphasis on the human
faculty of reason.

Both men based their theologies on the idea of the

benevo-lence of the deity.

Chauncy affirm ed "supernatural ration-alism" as

did Mayhew, but Chauncy would abhor the title in favor of being labeled
simply a good Congregationalism36
im portant cleric in

Charles Chauncy, perhaps the most

Boston during the mid- to late-eighteenth century,

published more than Mayhew.
The

theology

of

Charles

Chauncy,

based on

the

assertion

of

the

benevolence of the deity, is best expressed in his "Body of Divinity."

As

Bezaleel Howard defines it, Chauncy’s "Body of Divinity" consists of The
Benevolence

of

the

Deitv

(1784), Five

Dissertations

on

the

Scripture
Chauncy

Account of the Fall

(1785), and Salvation for All

Men (1784).

began work on these

essays in early 1752, and the

project was completed

seven years later.37
The fundam ental work to the whole "Body of Divinity" is The Benevolence
of the Deitv.

Benevolence is "a principle disposing and prompting to the

communication of happi-ness."38

Conrad Wright, in The Beginnings of

Unitarianism . notes that - Chauncy, in defining benevolence, "took great
36 Edward M. G riffin , Old Brick. Charles Chauncv of
Boston: 1705-1787 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1980), p. 4.
37 Ibid., p. 109.
38 Charles Chauncy, The Benevolence
(Boston: Powars and Willis, 1784), p. 11.
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pains" to insist "that the word has exactly the same meaning when ascribed
to God as when applied" to humans.

Chauncy in this instance was arguing

against the high Calvinist notion of a gulf between God and humans.39
Chauncy states that "Every Being, in heaven and earth, to whom this
attribute may be applied, partakes of the same Quality, though not in the
same

m anner,

nor

in

the

same

degree

and

proportion."40

Divine

benevolence is "analogous to kind affection " in humans, but "only as kind
affection in us is attended with frailty."
in both mode and manner of exercise.

In God "it is absolutely perfect"

Benevolence in the deity explicitly

denotes the same thing with a "disposition freely to communicate all the
good that is consistent with wise and fit conduct."

God, the benevolent

deity, "knows all the ways of producing happiness."41
Human

beings

in

The

Benevolence

of

the

Deitv

are

portrayed

as

intelligent moral agents who have the "ability and freedom to Will, as well
as to do."42

They have mental and moral capacities of perfection and

happiness that depend upon themselves.

As in Mayhew’s universe, humans,

for Chauncy, occupy a middling position between God and the brute
creature.

Human beings are "partly animal and partly rational, being allied

both to the highest, and the lowest orders of being in the universe."43
The "chain of being," an idea found in many Puritan theologies such as
those of Perkins, Ames, Edwards, and Mayhew, reappears again in Chauncy’s
39 Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in
America (Boston: Starr King Press, 1955), p. 171-172.
40 Chauncy, Benevolence of the Deitv. p. 14.
41 Ibid., pp. 18, 38-39.
42 Ibid., title page.
43 Ibid., pp. 62, 86.
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thought.

Humans within Chauncy’s chain of being constitute "one person"

or "living agent."

The human constitution, formed by God is an "illustrious

instance of the Divine goodness.

Because of this, humans are able to

"conceive of the Deitv as absolutely and perfectly benevolent."44
The ability to discern the benevolence of the deity is not the only mental
capacity humans have.
humans as having.

There are two others that Chauncy describes

The first "furnishes us with the materials of knowledge;

the other qualifies us for the proper use of them."45
knowledge are furnished by sensation.

The materials of

Sensation "is that capacity by means

of which impression from without become perceptions w ithin ."
impressions affect the mind and give rise to sensible ideas.

These

Reflection

qualifies the proper use of the ideas of sensation and includes the m ind’s
capacity for introspection.46
Knowledge in Chauncy’s psychology reflects the two mental capacities of
sensation and reflection.
Knowledge is an assent grounded on the perception of the bodily
senses, or the operation of our reasonable powers.
External objects
strike our senses, and we at once know what impressions we receive
from them. And we have an ability of mind to reason upon things,
comparing them
together, deducing consequences from them, forming a
judgment how
far this or that is true or false, and giving or
with-holding our assent accordingly.47
Chauncy’s psychology is Lockean in one sense because knowledge is gained
through the senses, but it is scholastic in its insistence on the division of
44 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
45 Ibid., p. 97.
46 Ibid.
47 Charles
seasonable and
1765), pp. 71-72.

Chauncy, Twelve Sermons On the following
important Subjects (Boston: D. & J. Kneeland,
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the faculties.

The capacities and faculties of the mind are separate in

Chauncy’s psychology just as they are in the faculty psychology of earlier
Puritans.

The unifying sense of Locke’s psychology did not have the same

impact on Charles Chauncy that it did on Jonathan Edwards.
Besides having a mental faculty and mental capacities, humans are also
endowed

with

a

moral

faculty.

Moral

knowledge,

"a

knowledge," is non-material and concerns the moral world.
of the human moral faculty reside in their
self-determination, and their conscience.

new

sort

of

The attributes

moral sense, their ability of

The moral sense, implanted by

God, enables humans at once "to distinguish between moral good, moral
evil."48

Self-determination is the human capacity to attain happiness for

themselves, and the conscience is a witness to testify for or against us.49
All

of

these

attributes

are

derived from

God, the

benevolent

deity.

Reflecting upon the moral world allows humans to "perceive a difference of
powers

in

[their]

own

constitution,

some

superior,

others

inferior."

Becoming acquainted with these powers and the governance thereof consists
in a "moral economy" which is hum ankind’s "greatest glory."50
The

constitution

of

human

beings,

being

both

material

and

moral,

intellectual and moral, and rational and sensi-ble, "evidently carries with it
the marks of

benevolence."

Human nature therefore is "adorned and

endowed" wonderfully with a "supreme and perfect goodness."51
powers, intellectual and moral, however, are not fully developed.
48 Chauncy, Benevolence of the Deitv. p. 120.
49 Ibid., pp. 120, 144.
50 Ibid., p. 106
51 Ibid., p. 107.
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beings are born with weak and feeble intellectual powers and only "in a
slow and leisurely way, under due cultivation, and in the use of labor and
oain." do "they gain strength, and advance to any considerable degrees of
their attainable perfection."
higher degrees."

Every human is born capable of "attaining still

This progression towards perfection "is the most natural

and rational one that could have been contrived."52 Human beings depend
upon themselves in Chauncy’s schema, for humans can only attain to
perfection by their own endeavors.
The moral sense of the human nature, implanted by God, allows for an
easy distinction between moral good and moral evil.
however, where it is hard to discern the difference.

There are points,
Mayhew felt that at

points the line between good and evil became blurred and therein some
chose wrongly.

Chauncy considered both sides of the issue of good and

evil like Mayhew did, but he pushed for a greater connection between the
opposing sides of the dialectical struggle in the soul.

In Benevolence of

the

two opposite

Deitv

Chauncy

denies

independent principles.
see how.

that

good

and

evil

are

and

Good and evil are connected; humans just cannot

The connection "surpasses our ability particularly to trace the

ways wherein it may tend to good."53 This points out Chauncy’s insistence
on the coherency and consistency of creation and allowed him to state that
evil can be good.

Evil is not a theological problem; it is a human problem.

Evil and suffering occur in this world as a trial: "the proper tendency and

52 Ibid., p. 113.
53 Ibid., p. 179.
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final cause of evils and suffering . . . are to do us good, in the natural and
moral sense, or both. They are a suitably adapted mean to this end."54
The only basis of moral obligation for Chauncy is the ability of
self-determination.

Human beings "are at liberty to will or not to will, to

chuse or not to chuse, the doing of these and those actions."

As free

agents endowed by God it is the human nature that constitutes them as
free.

Free agency is "the grand supporting pillar of the world, considered

as moral" and the author is God.55
The self-determination of the will argument that Chauncy puts forth
stands in direct contrast to that of Jonathan Edwards in Freedom of the
Will. Edwards rejected the Arminian notions of Chauncy and others because
they put too much power into the hands of human beings—they shut God
out of the world.

Edwards denied the self-determination of the will.

Chauncy, however, felt the will had a power of self-determination and that
this free agency rests in the benevolence of the deity in endowing human
nature with such. This difference between Chauncy and Edwards over
self-determination
anthropologies.

points

to

the

fundam ental

difference in

their

Edwards discussed the issues in terms of Locke’s unifying

psychology, while Chauncy spoke in terms of the faculty psychology, and as
a result they disagreed.

The debate between Edwards and Chauncy went

beyond the psycho-logical realm, into the theological arena.
One of the theological disagreements between Edwards and Chauncy
centers around the fall of Adam and the subsequent innate depravity of
54 Charles Chauncy, The Mvsterv Hid from All Ages. Made
Manifest bv the Gospel Revelation (London: C. Dilly, 1784),
p. 324.
55 Chauncy, Benevolence of the Deitv. pp. 128, 132, 135.
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humankind.
depravity

Edwards defended the orthodox doctrine of Puritanism, the

of humankind.

Jonathan

Mayhew

denied the depravity

of

hum ankind and so did Charles Chauncy.
A more shocking idea can scarcely be given of the Deitv.than that
which represents him as arbi-trarily dooming the greater part of the
race of men to eternal misery. Was he wholly destitute of goodness,
vea. positively malevolent in his natu re, a worse representation could
not be well made of him . And vet, this is the true import of the
doctrine of absolute and unconditional repro-bation, as it has been
taught, even bv those who profess faith in God as a benevolent, vea.
an infinitely benevolent Being.56
The result of Chauncy’s belief in the benevolence of the deity is an
anthropology that could not assert that humans were inherently evil.
Chauncy asserts in dissertation one of Five Dissertations on the Scripture
Account of the Fall: and its consequences that human beings are created in
the image of God.

What he means is that humans have "naked capacities"

and by using these humans can attain unto perfection.
the "capacity" for God’s likeness.57

Human beings have

Just as there is a progression towards

perfection of the intellectual and moral powers there is a corresponding
progression in the spiritual and religious abilities of humans.

These beliefs

led Chauncy, like Mayhew, to affirm the connection between fa ith and
works.

Chauncy states "instead of denying faith to be a work.

to be one."58

I avow it

The connection between faith and works is expressed as a

"duty" and it is every human being’s "duty" to strive for perfection in
things spiritual.

In Chauncy’s mind, how could humans be depraved if they

could attain unto perfection?
56 Ibid., p. viii.
57 Charles Chauncy, Five Dissertations on the Scrip
ture Account of the Fall (London: n.p., 1785), p. 23.
58 Chauncy, Twelve Sermons, p. 121.
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Chauncy’s argument against the orthodox doctrine of innate depravity also
focused on a rejection of imputed sin and Jonathan Edwards’s "one complex
person," Adam.59

Adam was not formed in a state of moral perfection as

the Calvinists held but was created, Chauncy states, "with nothing more
than those capacities which are proper to a being of that order in which he
was created."60 God "endowed" Adam with "naked capacities" which would
enable him to "attain to that perfection in resembling the Deity he was
originally form ed and designed for."61 Adam, however, broke his covenant
w ith God.

Adam’s forsaking the covenant resulted in two types of evil in

this world: 1) natural evil such as physical death, fear, shame, and a sense
of guilt, and 2) judicial evil which required labor, sorrow, and suffering
that eventually ends with the loss of life.62

Adam’s posterity, however,

according to Chauncy, did not participate in his sin.

Human beings are not

guilty of the original sin, but "the human race descends from Adam in his
lapsed state" and as a result humanity

inherits mortality.63

Chauncy

therefore asserted that hum anity is not innately depraved.
If hum anity is not depraved, then why do sin and evil persist?
answers

this

question

by

corporate nature of sin.

pointing

out

the

personal

rather

Chauncy
than

the

Sin is "a moral irregularity" that "stands in

necessary connection with the agent who commits it, and must therefore, in
59 Smith, Changing Conceptions, p. 53.
60 Chauncy, Five Dissertations, p. 23.
61 Ibid.
62 Smith, Changing
Dissertations, pp. 108-112.

Conceptions, p. 52; Chauncy, Five

63 Chauncy, Five Dissertations, p. 129.
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the nature of things, be Personal.”64

Human beings su ffer in Adam’s sin

and death, but they are not guilty of it.

Chauncy denies the interpretation

of I Corinthians that holds that hum ankind comes into existence as morally
corrupt.

Adam’s sin is "merely the instrument or medium . . . through

which God communicated" the human nature.

Humans cannot be inherently

sinful or depraved because there is no agency involved.

They are born

mortal and imperfect, according to Chauncy, but not depraved or sinful.
Human

beings

in

Chauncy’s eyes are nothing

but "corruptible mortal

creatures by nature.”65
Charles Chauncy, as Edward G riffin describes him, felt that "by insisting"
upon the depravity of human nature the evangelical New Lights of the
Great Awakening "influenced the people to define themselves as unworthy
of the great task before them."

The task that Chauncy saw before the

colonists was that of being a "redeemer nation."

Chauncy believed that, by

using only their unaided reason, human beings could discern the basics of
religion: the existence of God, the necessity of religion, and the existence
of a fu tu re life that held forth reward or punishment.66 In the full scope
of things, however, reason also needed the affections.

During the Great

Awakening the question became, how much of the revivals is the working of
God?

Because Chauncy consistently affirm ed the benevolence of the deity

and because he affirm ed God’s justice, we have two distinct answers.

Did

the revivals rely too much upon the affections at the expense of reason?
Chauncy, like Mayhew, thought they did.
64 Ibid., p. 131.
65 Ibid., p. 132.
66 G riffin, Old Brick, pp. 4-5.
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Jonathan Edwards through his preaching initiated the revivals that grew
into the Great Awakening.
work

of

God.

At one

Consequently, he defended the revivals as the
point the

enthusiasm exceeded the limits of

Edw ards’s approval, and in the Religious Affections he noted the excesses
of the revivals and qualified God’s role in the stirrings of grace that were
ram pant throughout New England.

The excesses of the revivals were the

results of the corruption of human-kind.

Chauncy, on the other hand,

though he never stated that the revivals were not the work of God, felt
the revivals were not wonderful or glorious instances of the workings of
God.

Too much disorder, doctrinal error, and enthusiasm prevailed.

The

errors of the revivals were not the result of the corruption of hum ankind
for Chauncy, but they were the effects of itinerant preachers and a
preaching style that appealed to the affections.67
The differences between Chauncy and Edwards can be condensed into a
disagreement over the workings of the Spirit and opposing theories of
psychology. Edwards, as defender of the revivals, upheld the affections and
their efficacy in the things of religion and never denied the powers of
reason of the human mind.

Charles Chauncy never rejected the importance

of the affections, but he felt that things had gone awry in the Great
Awakening.
England.

In Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New

Chauncy

states

that

"an

enlightened

Mind,

and

not

raised

Affections, ought always to be the Guide of those who call themselves Men;
and this, in the A ffairs of Religion, as well as other Things."68
67 Ibid., pp. 79-85.
68 Charles Chauncy, Seasonable Thoughts on the State of
Religion in New England (Boston: Rogers and Fowle, 1743), p.
327.
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Chauncy’s psychology

rests

upon

his

ideas

about

hierarchical arrangement, and its chain of being.
organized in a like manner.

the

universe,

its

The human being was

The capacities of humans were ordered,

ascending from the lower bodily functions to the highest faculties of the
mind, willing and reasoning. The affections in Chauncy’s system of thought
reside below the faculty of reason.

With religion the importance lay in

keeping a balance between the reason and the affections.

The "heart"

might influence the "head," for the "passions, when suitably mov’d, tend
rightly to awaken the reasonable powers, and put them on a lively and
vigorous exercise."

The obverse could take place as well; humans could be

struck by the beauty of creation and its amiability and then be moved to
love God.

The problem with the Great Awakening, according to Chauncy,

lay in its unbalanced nature: the affections swayed the balance.

For

Chauncy the affections needed to be balanced with the understanding
because fundam entally, the higher powers govern; an "Enlightened Mind"
guides the "raised Affections."
The anthropology that emerges from the thought of Chauncy, similar to
that of Mayhew, begins and ends with the theological assertion of the
benevolence

of

the

deity

and

revolves

around

psychology that emphasizes the faculty of reason.

an

outdated

faculty

Chauncy’s anthropology,

anthropocentric in character, when coupled with that of Mayhew, stands in
contrast to the concepts of human nature espoused earlier in New England’s
history.

C onclusion

Samuel Willard, John Wise, Jonathan Edwards, Jonathan Mayhew, and
Charles Chauncy, New England divines, left sermons and treatises that
disclose their thoughts about human nature.

The concepts of human nature

that are found in their works reveal much about how they viewed life.
When taken as a whole, these concepts point to and reinforce the thesis of
change in New England from 1676 to 1776. Many factors were involved in
this

transform ation,

and

many

scholars

have

aptly

demonstrated

the

economic, political, intellectual, religious, and social changes that occurred
in eighteenth-century New England.
Merle Curti, in

Human

Nature

in

American

Thought, describes

the

emergence in America during the eighteenth century of an anthropocentric
world view from the theocentric bastion of orthodox Puritanism. The thesis
of this essay is the same: that in the one hundred years before the
American Revolution the concept of human nature in New England changed.
The emergence of an anthropocentric theological anthropology in the minds
of such men as Chauncy and Mayhew is not something which has gone
undiscovered, and Curti was not the first to advance the notion that
religious thought in America went from being almost singularly theocentric
to rather anthropocentric in the eighteenth century.

There are many

reasons for the appearance of anthropocentric concepts of human nature
during these years.

It has not, however, been the objective of this thesis

to answer questions about causation.
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This essay merely discovers the
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"what," the substance of the change in the theological anthropology of New
England.
The theocentric foundation for most concepts of human nature in the
seventeenth century eroded in the eighteenth but did not fall into ruin as
an anthropocentric alternative emerged.

From the eighteenth century to

the present, these two world views have opposed each other for control of
the religious mind in America.

The concepts of human nature that Willard,

Wise, Edwards, Mayhew, and Chauncy espoused rested on one or the other
of

these two foundations

or world

views, and each of

these figures

represents a significant aspect of what became an ever-expanding argument
in American religious thought.
Willard’s concept of human nature as depraved reflects the theocentric
foundation of his orthodox heritage.

John Wise, drawing upon the natural

rights theory of Samuel Pufendorf, rejected this view.

Wise represents the

early phase of the Enlightenment in New England thought wherein a
universe infused with Reason could not support a Calvinist concept of
human nature.

Rather than opting for the theo-centric world view of

Willard, Wise chose an anthropocentric world view that focused upon the
right reason of human beings.
Jonathan Edwards represents Puritan orthodoxy in the mid-eighteenth
century.

Edw ards’s concept of human nature, theocentric in its foundation,

emphasizes the depravity of humanity as well as the native abilities of
humankind.

Perry

Miller,

in

describing

seventeenth-century

Puritan

psychology and anthropology, noted how Puritans could declare humanity
depraved

but at the same

time capable of

Edwards fits this description well.

many noble achievements.

The scripturally-based writings of

Edwards reveal a concept of human nature as depraved, while his scientific
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and philosophical writings portray humans as noble creatures.

It may

appear that Edw ards’s thought about human nature is contradictory, but it
is not.

Edw ards’s anthropology is clearly theocentric in character, for his

scriptural, scientific, and philosophical writings are based on a belief that
everything depends upon God.
The

anthropology

of

Jonathan

Edwards

stands

in

anthropologies of Charles Chauncy and Jonathan Mayhew.

contrast

to

the

Edwards upheld

the theocentric world view of Willard and seventeenth-century Puritanism.
Chauncy and Mayhew picked up and carried on the tune that Wise began in
the early eighteenth century, a tune of "supernatural rationalism."
Wise,

Chauncy

anthropology.
orthodox

and

advocated

an

anthropocentric

theological

What is ironic, as Perry Miller has pointed out, is that the

Puritan,

Enlightenment

Mayhew

Like

Edwards,

and

that

embraced
Chauncy

the
and

unifying
Mayhew,

psychology
advocates

of
of

the
the

Enlightenment doctrine of reason, the coherence of the universe, and the
harmony

of nature,

could

not

break out of

the bounds of medieval

scholastic or faculty psychology.1
The emerging anthropocentric character of the concept of human nature
that Wise, Mayhew, and Chauncy represent stands in opposition to the
theocentric

concept

of

human

nature

of

Willard

and

Edwards.

The

anthropocentric concept of human nature advanced by Wise, Mayhew, and
Chauncy points to the fact that New England Puritanism was changing.

No

longer would the world be explained from a theocentric stance without
being

challenged

by

an

opposing

anthropocentric

argument.

1 Perry Miller and Alan Heimert, eds. The Great
Awakening: Documents Illustrating the Crisis and its
Consequences (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. xi.

An
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anthropocentric world view would now vie with the theocentric world view
for dominance in American religious thought.
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